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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4570
This paper develops a seven-region comparative static 
computable general equilibrium model of Russia to assess 
the impact of accession to the World Trade Organization 
on these seven regions (the federal okrugs) of Russia. 
In order to assess poverty and distributional impacts, 
the model includes ten households in each of the seven 
federal okrugs, where household data are taken from 
the Household Budget Survey of Rosstat. The model 
allows for foreign direct investment in business services 
and endogenous productivity effects from additional 
varieties of business services and goods, which the 
analysis shows are crucial to the results. National welfare 
gains are about 4.5 percent of gross domestic product 
This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department to   
assess the impact of trade and foreign direct investment liberalization in business services on income growth and poverty 
reduction. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at dtarr@worldbank.org.  
in the model, but in a constant returns to scale model 
they are only 0.1 percent. All deciles of the population in 
all seven federal okrugs can be expected to significantly 
gain from Russian World Trade Organization accession, 
but due to the capacity of their regions to attract foreign 
direct investment, households in the Northwest region 
gain the most, followed by households in the Far East 
and Volga regions. Households in Siberia and the Urals 
gain the least. Distribution impacts within regions are 
rather flat for the first nine deciles; but the richest decile 
of the population in the three regions that attract a lot 
of foreign investment gains significantly more than the 
other nine representative households in those regions. 
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Russia is the largest economy in the world that is not a member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and, as of early-2008, it was among 29 countries in the long process of negotiating its accession 
to the WTO. Russia applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
June 1993 and the GATT Working Party was transformed into the World Trade Organization Working 
Party in 1995. By early-2008, Russia had reached bilateral agreements with almost all nations on its WTO 
Working Party and was moving on to focus on the “multilateral” issues (including agricultural subsidies 
and intellectual property enforcement); but a significant dispute with Georgia remained on the issue of 
customs posts between the countries.
3  
In response to a request from the Government of Russia to the World Bank for a quantitative 
assessment of the impact of WTO accession on poverty and household effects in Russia, Rutherford and 
Tarr (forthcoming) examined the household and poverty effects in a national model. But since that paper 
was based on a national model, it assumed that factor prices were the same throughout Russia.  Research 
has shown, however, that there are significant differences in incomes between the richest and poorest 
regions of Russia (for details, see World Bank, 2005). The richest Russian regions are 67 times richer 
than the poorest Russian regions in nominal terms and 33 times richer when price differences between the 
regions are taken into account. The richest regions include the European North, Moscow and the resource 
rich regions of Siberia and the Far East.  The poorest regions include the North Caucuses, Southern 
Siberia and Central Russia. Persons with the same characteristics in terms of education, employment 
status and urbanization are three times more likely to be poor in Dagestan or Tuva Republic compared 
with the rich Tumen oblast or Moscow city. Clearly, to assess the poverty consequences of a major policy 
change like WTO accession, which is expected to impact factor incomes significantly, it is necessary to 
construct a model with different regions of Russia so as to allow regional differences in factor prices. 
  2Recognizing the vast geographic and income differences of the regions, Rutherford and Tarr 
(2006) have assessed the impact of Russian WTO accession through the use of a a model of the regions of 
Russia. That model, however, contained only one representative household in each region. Despite the 
large differences in incomes between the regions of Russia, 90 percent of the income inequality in Russia 
is due to within region inequality and only 10 percent is due to between region differences in incomes 
(World Bank, 2005, p.xix). Thus, for an assessment of the poverty effects of WTO accession, it is 
necessary to incorporate the within region income diversity as fully as possible.  
In this paper we develop a seven region, comparative static, computable general equilibrium 
model of Russia for the purpose of assessing the impacts of Russian WTO accession on households and 
poverty. We choose as our seven regions the seven Russian federal “okrugs.” These Russian federal 
“okrugs” are aggregations of contiguous Russian legal jurisdictions within their geographic boundaries. 
We list the seven federal okrugs and the Russian jurisdictions that comprise them in table 2. Further 
details on the federal okrugs, including a map of Russia decomposed into the seven federal okrugs and 
discussions of the legal jurisdictions that comprise the okrugs may be found on Wikepedia.
4  
In order to assess impacts on poverty and income distribution we develop a model with ten 
representative households in each of the seven federal okrugs. Our information from households is drawn 
from the relatively new and now publicly available survey of 44, 529 Russian households, known at the 
NOBUS survey. 
Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2007) have shown that, regarding Russian WTO accession, a model 
which allows foreign direct investment in business services and endogenous productivity effects from 
liberalization of goods and services via the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier productivity effect from greater varieties 
produces estimated welfare gains many times larger than a constant returns to scale (CRTS) model. A 
CRTS model will capture only the resource allocation efficiency gains from trade in goods, as well as any 
terms of trade gains.  Given that insight, we regard it as essential to go beyond a multi-regional model of 
Russia based on constant returns to scale. Our model allows foreign direct investment in the business 
services sectors in a multi-region model of a small open economy and Dixit-Stiglitz endogenous 
productivity effects from liberalization of foreign direct investment in services plays a role in the 
interpretation of results.
5  More specifically, the structure of the model for each region of Russia is the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 See Tarr (2007) for a summary of issues, accomplishments and remaining challenges for Russian WTO accession.  
4 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_districts_of_Russia#Central_Federal_District. 
 
5 Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005) developed a stylized model where foreign direct investment is required for 
entry of new multinational competitors in services, but they did not apply this model to the data of an actual 
economy and there was no foreign direct investment in the initial equilibrium of the model. Brown and Stern (2001) 
and Dee et al. (2003) employ three sector stylized multi-country numerical models with many of the same features of 
  3same productive structure as in the national model of Russia of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr; but we have 
constructed the regional models based on the data for the regions, including adding federal okrugs and we 
have incorporated data on foreign direct investment in business services in the regions of Russia.  
The exogenous changes that we model as part of Russian WTO accession are (i) liberalization of 
barriers against multinational providers of business services; (ii) a 50 percent reduction in tariffs on 
goods; and (iii) an improvement in market access for Russian exports to WTO member country markets. 
The key messages from this paper are that it is the liberalization of barriers against multinational 
providers of business services that we expect to provide the greatest gains to from WTO accession, and 
that there is a lot more at stake in WTO accession for Russia (and we believe in trade and FDI 
liberalization more generally) than the Harberger triangle gains from resource reallocation effects due to 
tariff reduction or from the terms of trade gains due to improved market access.  Liberalization of barriers 
against multinational providers of business services results in additional varieties of business services. 
Through the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier endogenous productivity mechanism, this leads to welfare gains that 
dominate the results. A traditional constant returns to scale model is not be able to capture the 
productivity effects of trade or FDI liberalization in services. To demonstrate this we simulate Russian 
WTO accession in a constant returns to scale model and find that the gains are about 4-5 percent of the 
estimated gains in our model with imperfect competition and FDI liberalization in services.  
Partly our results derive from the fact that estimated barriers against multinational service 
providers are higher than tariffs on goods, but the significant cost share of business services in the 
production of manufacturing and agriculture is also important. At the regional level, regions vary 
significantly in their gains based on their capacity to attract additional multinational providers of business 
services. Thus, while improving its offer to foreign services providers within the context of the GATS has 
been one of the most difficult aspects of Russia’s negotiation for WTO accession, our estimates suggest 
that the most important component of WTO accession for Russia and its regions in terms of the welfare 
gains is liberalization of its barriers against FDI in services sectors. 
More specifically, our central estimates are that the overall gains to Russia from WTO accession 
are 8.1 percent of Russian consumption (or 4.5 percent of GDP).  By region, the welfare gains as a 
percent of GDP range from 3.8 and 3.9 percent in the cases of Siberia and the Urals, to 5.6 percent in the 
Northwest region. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr.  Results in the Brown and Stern paper depend crucially on capital flows between 
nations, with capital importing nations typically gaining and capital exporting nations typically losing. In Dee et al., 
(2003), multinationals are assumed to capture the quota rents initially. So results of liberalization depend crucially on 
the fact that liberalization transfers rents to capital importing countries. 
  4We observe that the reduction in barriers to FDI alone results in an improvement in Russian 
welfare on average across regions of 4.0 percent of of GDP. The other exogenous changes that we assume 
to be part of the WTO accession scenario are improved market access for Russian exporters and Russian 
tariff reduction. Together these contribute to an improvement in Russian welfare by 0.8 percent of 
consumption or 0.5 percent of GDP. Thus, over 85 percent of the gains derive from the reduction in 
barriers to FDI in services.  
In the sensitivity analysis, we also incorporate data on the investment potential of regions based 
on the investment potential rankings of Expert RA. The principal result is that the estimated gains for 
Volga increase.  Despite smaller estimated gains in this scenario, Far East and Northwest are still 
estimated to receive above average gains. The results suggest that the gains for a region could vary 
considerably depending on whether it succeeds in creating an atmosphere conducive to investment. 
Returns to skilled labor, unskilled labor and mobile capital all increase at about the same rates, 
although at different rates across our seven regions. Consequently, within each region, the gains of 
households tend to be rather similar, although they differ between regions. Owners of specific capital 
used by multinational service providers gain substantially more than owners of other factors, so the 
richest households in the regions which are able to attract a lot of foreign direct investment (Northwest, 
Volga and Far East) gain the most.  
In goods sectors, we estimate that the ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals and chemicals sectors 
are the goods sectors that expand in the regions where these are important sectors. These are the sectors 
that export the most intensively. They also experience a terms of trade gain from improved treatment in 
antidumping cases. These sectors are relatively important in the Central, Urals, Volga and Siberia regions. 
We estimate that food, construction materials and other goods producing sectors will contract throughout 
the various regions. These sectors export relatively less and are relatively highly protected.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the model and the most important 
data. In section III, we describe and interpret the policy scenarios and quantitatively assess the sensitivity 
of the results to parameter assumptions. Many of the scenarios we describe are decomposition scenarios 
that allow us to assess the relative importance of the various aspects that we consider important to 
Russian WTO accession. We provide sensitivity analysis in section IV and briefly conclude in section V. 
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II. Overview of the Model and Key Data 
 
Production and Geographic Structure 
There are 30 sectors in the model; these are listed in table 1. There are three types of sectors: 
perfectly competitive goods and services, imperfectly competitive goods sectors and imperfectly 
competitive business services sectors.  
The geographic decomposition of our model of Russia is shown in table 2. In the first instance, 
we obtain data from the publication the Regions of Russia by Rosstat on 88 regions of Russia. The 88 
regions have several names in Russian; the most common legal jurisdiction is referred to in Russian as an 
“oblast.” Oblasts are analogous to states in the United States or provinces in Canada. But there are also 
jurisdictions known as territories, federal cities, autonomous districts and an autonomous region. Since we 
want to use the term “region” for another purpose in the model, we use the Russian term “oblast” for all 
of these 88 geographic areas,
6 with the understanding that they are not all oblasts in the Russian sense of 
the term.  
  The Russian Federation under President Putin has established seven federal okrugs that are 
aggregations of contiguous oblasts. The mapping of oblasts into federal okrugs is also shown in table 2.  
In this paper, we shall analyze effects at the level of the federal okrug. Descriptive data on value-added, 
exports and imports by sector by federal okrug are presented in tables 3-11. 
We assume that firms and sectors operate at the okrug level, primary factors of production are not 
able to move between okrugs. Wage rates and the rental rates on capital adjust in each federal okrug so 
that there is no change in aggregate employment or use for any primary factor of production. 
Russia as a whole, represented as an aggregate of the federal okrugs, must satisfy a typical 
economy-wide balance of the trade constraint. The real exchange rate adjusts to assure that any change in 
the aggregate value of regional imports from the rest of the world, is matched by an equal change in the 
value of aggregate exports to the rest of the world. Each region also has a balance of trade constraint so 
that any change in the value of imports (either from the rest of the world or another federal okrug within 
Russia) is matched by an increase in the value of exports.  
                                                      
6 Several of the territories are part of oblasts, so it was necessary to adjust the data to avoid double counting of the 
territories.  
  6We assume a nested CES structure of demand.  Since this implies that the structure of demand is 
both homothetic and weakly separable, consumers and firms in a representative federal okrug r employ 
multiple stage budgeting for all goods. 
 
Product Variety and Endogenous Productivity in Goods and Services 
Winters et al. (2004) summarize the empirical literature by concluding that “the recent empirical 
evidence seems to suggest that openness and trade liberalization have a strong influence on productivity 
and its rate of change.” A typical constant returns to scale model, however, will exhibit only very small 
productivity gains from trade and FDI liberalization. As Romer (1994) has argued, product variety is a 
crucial and often overlooked source of gains to the economy from trade liberalization. In our model, it is 
the greater availability of varieties that is the crucial feature that results in productivity growth.
7  
Consequently, we take variety as a metaphor for the various ways increased trade can increase 
productivity. Some of the key articles regarding product variety are the following. Broda and Weinstein 
(2004) find that increased product variety contributes to a fall of 1.2 percent per year in the “true” import 
price index. Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Schott (2004) have shown that product variety and quality 
are important in explaining trade between nations. Feenstra et al. (1999) show that increased variety of 
exports in a sector increases total factor productivity in most manufacturing sectors in Taiwan (China) 
and Korea, and they have some evidence that increased input variety also increases total factor 
productivity. 
In business services, because of the high cost of using distant suppliers, the close availability of a 
diverse set of business services may be even more important for growth than in goods. As early as the 
1960s, the urban and regional economics literature argued that non-tradable intermediate goods (primarily 
producer services produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale) are an important source of 
agglomeration externalities which account for the formation of cities and industrial complexes, and 
account for differences in economic performance across regions. The more recent economic geography 
literature has also focused on the fact that related economic activity is economically concentrated due to 
agglomeration externalities.  Evidence comes from a variety of sources.  Arnold, Mattoo and Javorcik 
(2006) show that in the Czech Republic, services sector liberalization led to increased productivity of 
downstream industries, and the key channel through which reform led to increased productivity was 
                                                      
7 We believe there are other mechanisms through which trade may increase productivity. Trade or services 
liberalization may increase growth indirectly through its positive impact on the development of institutions (see 
Rodrik, Subramananian and Trebbi, 2004).  It may also induce firms to move down their average cost curves, or 
import higher quality products or shift production to more efficient firms within an industry.  Tybout and Westbrook 
(1995) find evidence of this latter type of rationalization for Mexican manufacturing firms. We thus take variety as a 
metaphor for the several mechanisms through which trade and services liberalization may increase productivity.  
  7allowing foreign entry.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that firms operating in economically dense areas 
are more productive than firms operating in relative isolation. Hummels (1995) shows that most of the 
richest countries in the world are clustered in relatively small regions of Europe, North America and East 
Asia, while the poor countries are spread around the rest of the world. He argues this is partly explained 
by transportation costs for inputs since it is more expensive to buy specialized inputs in countries that are 
far away. The high cost of using far away inputs is especially true of business services that are not 
provided locally, as Marshall (1988) shows that in three regions in the United Kingdom (Birmingham, 
Leeds and Manchester) almost 80 percent of the services purchased by manufacturers were bought from 
suppliers within the same region.   He cites studies which show that firm performance is enhanced by the 
local availability of producer services.. In developing countries, McKee (1988) argues that the local 
availability of producer services is very important for the development of leading industrial sectors. 
 
Price Determination 
  There are three types of goods or services in the model. We have: (i) competitive goods 
and services; (ii) goods produced under increasing returns to scale which compete with imports 
produced abroad; and (iii) services that are produced under increasing returns to scale in Russia, 
where Russian firms compete with multinational firms who also produce in Russia. The 
mathematical structure of these sectors is described in Rutherford and Tarr (2006b).  
 
Competitive Goods and Services Sectors 
Firms in each federal okrug have three choices for sales: sell in their own federal okrug; sell to 
other parts of Russia; or export to the rest of the world. This is depicted in figure 1.  Firms maximize 
revenue for any given output level based on their transformation possibilities between the three types of 
goods. Their transformation possibilities are defined by a constant elasticity of transformation production 
function. For all firms within the same federal okrug, the product they export to other parts of Russia 
(including other oblasts within their own federal okrug) is homogeneous.  It follows from our 
assumptions of homogeneous demand and production outside of the own federal okrug, that for each 
competitive good, say good g, there will be only three prices for good g of federal okrug r: the price of 
good g in federal okrug r; the price of good g from federal okrug r in other parts of Russia; and the price 
of good g from federal okrug r in the rest of the world. 
The structure of demand for goods or services from competitive sectors is shown in figure 2. In 
the first stage, consumers and firms decide how much to spend on any of the aggregate goods or services 
listed in table 1. Having decided on the value of expenditures on goods or services, consumers and firms 
  8in a representative federal okrug r optimize their choice of expenditures on foreign goods or services 
versus goods or services from Russia. Subsequently they optimally allocate their expenditures between 
goods from other Russian federal okrugs and their own federal okrug. Finally, they optimally allocate 
their expenditures between goods from the other Russian federal okrugs. This structure assumes that 
consumers differentiate the products of producers from different federal okrugs; but, they regard as 
homogeneous the products of producers from different oblasts within the same federal okrug.  
 
Goods Produced Subject to Increasing Returns to Scale 
The structure of demand for goods produced under increasing returns to scale is shown in figure 
3. Consumers (and firms) in RM r optimally allocate expenditures on good g among the goods available 
from the different federal okrugs of Russia and the rest of the world producers. Having decided how much 
to spend on the products from each federal okrug, consumers then allocate expenditures among the 
producers within each federal okrug. Since we assume identical elasticity of substitution at all levels, this 
is equivalent to firm level product differentiation of demand. That is, the structure is equivalent to a single 
stage in which consumers decide how much to spend on the output of each firm in the first stage of 
optimal allocation of expenditure.  
We assume that imperfectly competitive manufactured goods may be produced in each region or 
imported. Both Russian and foreign firms in these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is 
constant) equals marginal revenue in each federal okrug. There is a fixed cost of operating in each region 
and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero for each firm on its sales in each federal okrug in 
which it sells. Quasi-rents just cover fixed costs in each region in the zero profit equilibrium. We assume 
that all firms that produce from the same federal okrug have the same cost structure—the standard 
symmetry assumption. 
 Foreigners produce the goods abroad at constant marginal cost but incur a fixed cost of operating 
in each RM in Russia. The cif import price of foreign goods is simply defined by the import price.  By the 
zero profits assumption, in equilibrium the import price (less tariffs) must cover fixed and marginal costs 
that foreign firms incur in each federal okrug. 
Similar to foreign firms, Russian firms also produce their goods in their home regions; they incur 
a fixed cost of operation if each RM in which they operate. By the zero profit constraint, if they operate in 
a RM, the price of their product must just cover both fixed and marginal costs of operation in that RM. 
In figure 4, we depict the structure of production for imperfectly competitive Russian firms. 
Regional firms use intermediate inputs (which can be foreign inputs, inputs from other regions of Russia 
or from its own region) and primary factors of production to produce output. We emphasize that business 
services are not part of the “other services” nest; rather business services substitute for primary factors of 
  9production in a CES nest.
8 We show that the elasticity of substitution between business services and 
primary factors of production significantly impacts the results.  
We assume that Russian firms do not have any market power on world markets and thus act as 
price takers on their exports to world markets. On the exports to the rest of the world then, price equals 
marginal costs.  On sales to Russia, firms must use a specific factor in addition to the other factors of 
production. The existence of the specific factor implies that additional output or firms can only come at 
increasing marginal costs.  Imperfectly competitive Russian goods producers sell in all of Russia; but 
services firms do not sell in other Russian federal okrugs.  
We employ the standard Chamberlinian large group monopolistic competition assumption within 
a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which results in constant markups over marginal cost. For simplicity we 
assume that the composition of fixed and marginal cost is identical in all firms of the same type in a sector 
(in both goods and services). This assumption in a Dixit-Stiglitz based Chamberlinian large-group model 
assures that output per firm for all firm types remains constant, i.e., the model does not produce 
rationalization gains or losses.  
  An increase in the number of varieties increases the productivity of the use of imperfectly 
competitive goods based on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. Dual to the Dixit-Stiglitz quantity 
aggregator is the Dixit-Stiglitz cost function which shows the productivity adjusted cost of using the 
available varieties in the federal okrug when varieties are purchased at minimum cost for a given output 
level. This cost function for users of goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale declines in the 
total number of firms in the industry. The lower the elasticity of substitution, the more valuable is an 
additional variety.   
  We have assumed that imperfectly competitive firms within a federal okrug have symmetric cost 
structures and face symmetric demand for their outputs.  It follows from these assumptions that all 
imperfectly competitive firms from a federal okrug will obtain the same price in any federal okrug of 
Russia in which they operate, although the price will differ across federal okrugs since the fixed costs 
associated with entering any federal okrug varies across the federal okrugs.  
 
Services Sectors That Are Produced in Russia under Increasing Returns to Scale and 
Imperfect Competition 
                                                      
8 For example, firms can employ an accountant or a lawyer, or contract for accounting or legal services. They can 
employ a driver and buy a truck, or contract for delivery services.  These examples make it evident that it is more 
appropriate to allow substitution between business services and primary factors of production than to assume a 
Leontief structure. 
  10These sectors include telecommunications, financial services, most business services and 
transportation services. In services sectors, we observe that some services are provided by foreign service 
providers on a cross border basis analogous to goods providers from abroad. But a large share of business 
services are provided by service providers with a domestic presence, both multinational and Russian.
9 As 
shown in figure 5, our model allows for both types of foreign service provision in these sectors. There are 
cross border services allowed in this sector and they are provided from the firms outside of Russia at 
constant costs—this is analogous to competitive provision of goods from abroad. Cross border services 
from the rest of the world, however, are not good substitutes for service providers who have a presence 
within the federal okrug of Russia where consumers of these services reside.
10 
Russian firms providing imperfectly competitive business services operate at the regional level 
and organize production in a manner fully analogous to imperfectly competitive Russian firms producing 
goods. Thus, figure 4 applies to both Russian imperfectly competitive goods and services firms. Other 
assumptions we made for imperfectly competitive goods producers, such as entry conditions, pricing and 
symmetry are also apply to imperfectly competitive services providers. The only difference is that we 
assume that regional services providers sell only in their own federal okrug. It follows from these 
assumptions that there is a unique price for all Russian providers of imperfectly competitive business 
services in a federal okrug.   
There are also multinational service firm providers that choose to establish a presence in a RM of 
Russia in order to compete with regional Russian firms. The decision to locate in a federal okrug by a 
multinational must take into account the existence of a fixed cost of operating in a federal okrug. As with 
imperfectly competitive goods producers, quasi-rents must cover the fixed plus marginal costs of 
producing in a federal okrug and we have a zero profit equilibrium.  
When multinational service providers decide to establish a domestic presence in a federal okrug 
of Russia, they will import some of their technology or management expertise. That is, foreign direct 
investment generally entails importing specialized foreign inputs. Thus, the cost structure of 
multinationals differs from Russian service providers. Multinationals incur costs related to both imported 
primary inputs and Russian primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor inputs. Foreign provision of 
services differs from foreign provision of goods, since the service providers use Russian primary inputs. 
This is shown in figure 6, where we show multinationals combining imported primary inputs with inputs 
                                                      
9 One estimate puts the world-wide cross-border share of trade in services at 41% and the share of trade in services 
provided by multinational affiliates at 38%. Travel expenditures 20% and compensation to employees working abroad 
1% make up the difference. See Brown and Stern (2001, table 1).  
10 Daniels (1985) found that service providers charge higher prices when the service is provided at a distance. 
  11of the service good from the oblasts within the federal okrug.  Domestic service providers do not import 
the specialized primary factors available to the multinationals. Figure 4 for Russian business service 
providers is analogous to figure 6 for multinational service providers except for the nest for imported 
primary inputs. Foreign service providers also must use a specific factor to produce the output and this 
implies that additional output can only be obtained at increasing marginal costs. Since the structure of 
costs for all multinational firms that provide a service in a given region m is identical and demand is 
symmetric, there is a unique price for all multinationals providers of service s in federal okrug m. 
 For multinational firms, the barriers to foreign direct investment affect their profitability and 
entry. Reduction in the constraints on foreign direct investment in a region will induce foreign entry that 
will typically lead to productivity gains because when more varieties of service providers are available, 
buyers can obtain varieties that more closely fit their demands and needs (the Dixit-Stiglitz variety effect).  
 
Factors of Production 
Primary factors include skilled and unskilled labor and three types of capital; (i) mobile capital 
(within regions); (ii) sector-specific capital in the energy sectors reflecting the exhaustible resource; and 
(iii) sector specific capital in imperfectly competitive sectors. We also have primary inputs imported by 
multinational service providers, reflecting specialized management expertise or technology of the firm. 
The existence of sector specific capital in several sectors implies that there are decreasing returns to scale 
in the use of the mobile factors and supply curves in these sectors slope up.   
The above list of primary factors exists in all regions. In the case of skilled and unskilled labor it 
is natural to assume that the representative agent in the region obtains the returns from these factors of 
production. Consistent with standard trade models, in our central model we assume that capital and labor 
are immobile between regions. However, this model is a regional disaggregation of a national model of 
Russia; consequently, it does not seem reasonable to assume that all capital in a region is owned by the 
agents in that region. Thus, in our central scenario, we allow the capital in any region to be held by all 
Russians. It is convenient to think of a national mutual fund that holds the capital in each region. For all 
three capital types, this mutual fund invests in all regions and obtains an overall return. Individual 
households obtain a share of the returns of this mutual fund in proportion to their own capital earnings as 
a share of total capital earnings based on the NOBUS data set.  We do sensitivity analysis, where we 
allow a fraction of the capital in any region to be held by agents inside the region.  
. 
  12Key Data
11 
 
  Ad Valorem Equivalence of Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Services Sectors 
Among the key restrictions against multinational service providers that have existed or exist in Russia are: 
the Rostelecom monopoly on long distance fixed-line telephone services (scheduled to be removed), 
affiliate branches of foreign banks are prohibited, and there is a quota on the multinational share of the 
insurance market.
 12  Estimates of the ad valorem equivalence of these and other barriers to FDI in 
services are key to the results. Consequently, we commissioned 20 page surveys from Russian research 
institutes that specialize in these sectors and econometric estimates of these barriers based on these 
surveys.   
These questionnaires provided us with data, descriptions and assessments of the regulatory 
environment in these sectors.
 13  Using this information and interviews with specialist staff in Russia, as 
well as supplementary information we provided to them, Kimura, Ando and Fujii then estimated the ad 
valorem equivalence of barriers to foreign direct investment in several Russian sectors, namely in 
telecommunications; banking, insurance and securities; and maritime and air transportation services.
14 
The process involved converting the answers and data of the questionnaires into an index of 
restrictiveness in each industry. Kimura et al. then applied methodology explained in the volume by C. 
Findlay and T. Warren (2000), notably papers by Warren (2000), McGuire and Schulele (2000) and Kang 
(2000).  For each of these service sectors, authors in the Findlay and Warren volume evaluated the 
regulatory environment across many countries. The price of services is then regressed against the 
regulatory barriers to determine the impact of any of the regulatory barriers on the price of services. 
Kimura et al. then assumed that the international regression applies to Russia. Applying that regression 
and their assessments of the regulatory environment in Russia from the questionnaires and other 
information sources, they estimated the ad valorem impact of a reduction in barriers to foreign direct 
                                                      
11 Several Armington elasticities have recently been estimated for Russia by Ivanova (2005). We took these values 
where they were available, as explained in figures 2 and 3. Otherwise, elasticities were taken from Jensen, 
Rutherford and Tarr. 
12 The protocol on Russian accession signed between the European Union and Russia on May 21, 2004 calls for the 
termination of the Rostelekom monopoly by 2007 and allows for an increase in the upper limit on the multinational 
share of the Russian insurance market. 
13   This information was provided by the following Russian companies or research institutes: Central Science 
Institute of Telecommunications Research (ZNIIS) in the case of telecommunications, Expert RA for banking, 
insurance and securities; Central Marine Research and Design Institute (CNIIMF) for maritime transportation 
services and Infomost for air transportation services. We thank Vladimir Klimushin of ZNIIS; Dmitri Grishankov 
and Irina Shuvalova of  ExpertRA; Boris Rybak and Dmitry Manakov of InfoMost; and Tamara Novikova, Juri 
Ivanov and  Vladimir Vasiliev of CNIIMF. The questionnaires are available at www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto. 
The same sources provided the data on share of expatriate labor discussed below. 
  13investment in these services sectors.
15 The results of the estimates are listed in table 2.
 16  In the case of 
maritime and air transportation services, we assume that the barrier will only be cut by 15 percentage 
points, since pressure from the Working Party in these sectors is not strong.  
Share of Expatriate Labor Employed by Multinational Service providers. The impact of 
liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in business services sectors on the demand for labor 
in these sectors will depend importantly on the share of expatriate labor used by multinational firms. We 
explain in the results section that despite the fact that multinationals use Russian labor less intensively 
than their Russian competitors, if multinationals use mostly Russian labor their expansion is likely to 
increase the demand for Russian labor in these sectors.
17  We obtained estimates of the share of expatriate 
labor or specialized technology that is used by multinational service providers in Russia, but which is not 
available to Russian firms, from the Russian research institutes that specialize in these sectors. In general, 
we found that multinational service providers use mostly Russian primary factor inputs and only small 
amounts of expatriate labor or specialized technology. In particular, the estimated share of foreign inputs 
used by multinationals in Russia is: telecommunications, 10% plus or minus 2%; financial services, 3%, 
plus or minus 2%; maritime transportation, 3%, plus or minus 2%; and air transportation, 12.5%, plus or 
minus 2.5%. 
 
Tariff and Export Tax data 
Tariff rates by sector are taken from the paper by Tarr, Shepotylo and Koudoyarov (2006). Tarr, 
Shepotylo and Koudoyarov estimate the tariff rates by sector in our model based on the following data 
and methodology. For the purpose of calculating the tariff rates, they obtained data on the quantity and 
value of imports for 2001, 2002 and 2003 from the electronic database of the commercial company 
Academy-Service.
18 This dataset provides information on the Russian tariff structure at the tariff line 
level, i.e., the 10-digit level. The source of information on tariff rates is the Decree of the Government of 
Russian Federation on import duties #830.
19  The decree is available, for example, at www.consultant.ru. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
14 The three papers by Kimura, Ando and Fujii as well as the underlying responses to the surveys are available at 
www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto 
15   Warren estimated quantity impacts and then using elasticity estimates was able to obtain price impacts. The 
estimates by Kimura et al. that we employ are for “discriminatory” barriers against foreign direct investment. Kimura 
et al. also estimate the impact of barriers on investment in services that are the sum of discriminatory and non-
discriminatory barriers.  
16   See Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (forthcoming) for an explanation of the estimate in telecommunications.  
17 See Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005) for a detailed explanation on why FDI may be a partial equilibrium 
substitute for domestic labor but a general equilibrium complement.  
18 http://www.ftinform.com 
19 We looked at three editions of the decree: first, dated by 11.30.2001 for 2001; the second, dated by 02.06.2003 for 
2002 rates, and the third, dated by December 2003 for 2003 rates.  
  14  The average MFN tariff in Russia has increased between 2001 and 2003. On an un-weighted 
simple average basis it increased from 11.6% to 12.9%; on a weighted average basis it increased from 
11.4% to 14.5%. This average is calculated based on MFN tariffs. 
Collected tariffs are less than MFN tariffs because of several exemptions in the Russian tariff 
structure. Most notably, CIS imports usually enter tariff free (although there are exceptions to this rule), 
and personal and private imports also enter tariff free for sufficiently small values of imported shipments. 
 We also provide estimates of the tariff rates where we adjust for zero tariff collections on CIS imports. 
That is, in our formulas for calculating the tariff on a tariff line, we set ad valorem and specific rates on 
imports from the CIS countries equal to zero to take into account the special trade regime within the CIS. 
We call these calculations our estimated collected tariff rates. We find that overall estimated collected 
tariff rates are lower than the MFN rates by about 1 percent. 
Our overall estimated collected tariff rate was equal to 10.4% in 2001, 10.9% in 2002, and 11.5% 
in 2003. On the other hand, based on Ministry of Finance and Customs Committee data, the actual 
collected rate was 9.5% in 2001, 9.7% in 2002, and 9.8% in 2003.  The difference can be attributed to the 
fact that we did not take into account any exemptions other than the CIS free trade zone exemption.
20 
We believe collected tariff rates more closely approximate the protection a sector receives and the 
incentives it faces. Using our estimated collected tariff rates, and based on a Rosstat mapping from the 
tariff line data of the Customs Committee to the sectors in our input output table, we calculated a 
weighted average tariff rate for the sectors of our model. The results of this procedure for each sector of 
our model are reported in table 12a.  
  Export tax rates are calculated from the 2001 input-output table of Rosstat and are reported in 
table 12a. Since we do not change export taxes in the counterfactual simulations, these parameters are 
considerably less important to the results than the tariff rates.  
 
Improved Market Access 
Although many in the Russian government argue that improved market access from accession to 
the WTO is a major reason for WTO accession, Russia has already negotiated most-favored nation 
(MFN) status on a bilateral basis with most of its important trading partners, so Russia’s exporters will 
not see an immediate reduction in the tariffs they face and this effect may not be expected to be large. But 
Russia will have improved rights under antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in its export 
                                                      
20 To calculate actual collected rate, we used the Ministry of Finance data on collected import duties as a numerator. 
As a denominator, we used the overall import volume less import from Belarus as reported by the Russian Customs 
Committee. The exclusion of the imports from Belarus is determined by the fact that the electronic dataset which we 
used in the calculations reported import volume without imports from Belarus. 
  15markets. Consequently, we assume that Russian exporters in seven sectors which have been subject to 
antidumping actions in Russia’s export market, will receive and improvement in their terms of trade by 
either 1.5 percent or 0.5 percent. (See table 3 for details.)
21   
 
Input-output Tables 
The core input-output model is the 2001 table produced by Rosstat. The official table contained 
only 22 sectors, and importantly has little service sector disaggregation. In order to disaggregate the table, 
we used costs and use shares from our 35 sector Russian input-output table for 1995 prepared by expert S. 
P. Baranov. (For details see www.worldbank.org/trade/russia-wto.) When we broke up a sector such as oil 
and gas into oil, gas and oil processing, we assumed that the cost shares and use shares of the sector were 
the same in 2001 as they were in the 1995 table. For example, steel is an input to the oil and gas sector. 
Suppose in 1995, that oil purchased 55 percent of the steel used in oil and gas. Then we assume that in 
2001, oil purchased 55 percent of the steel used in oil and gas.  
 
Regional IO tables 
We constructed input-output tables of the 88 oblasts that are based on data from the oblasts 
(described below) and the national input-output table. The input-output tables for our ten federal okrugs 
are aggregates of the input-output tables of the oblasts in their respective federal okrugs. 
We assume that the technology of production is common across oblasts, so that the input-output 
coefficients from the national input-output table apply across all oblasts.  As a first step, for each 
industrial sector, we took the national output from the national input-output table for 2001, and we used 
the data in Regions of Russia to allocate the shares of that output across the 88 oblasts. That is, we have, 
by oblast, the value of total industrial output and industry shares of oblast industrial output for the year 
2000 (Regions of Russia 2001, table 13.3); thousands of tons of oil recovery, including gas condensate, 
for the year 2000 (Regions of Russia 2001, table 13.13); extraction of natural gas (in millions of cubic 
meters for the year 2000, (Regions of Russia 2001,table 13.14); thousands of tons of mined coal for the 
year 2000 (Regions of Russia 2001, table 13.15). This allows us to calculate the value of industry output 
by sector and oblast. For each industrial sector, we then proportionally scaled the value of oblast level 
output so that the sum of industrial output across all oblasts was equal to the value of national output of 
the sector from the national input-output table.  
                                                      
21 WTO accession will grant an “injury determination” to Russia in antidumping cases in WTO members countries. 
Combined with the decision by the US and the EU to treat Russia as a market economy this will imply Russian 
exporters may have considerably improved rights in these cases in the US. But market economy status may be 
denied in particular cases, so it will be necessary to see how this is implemented in practice.  
  16We infer oblast demand (and supply) of services, assuming that intermediate and final demand 
for services share a common intensity of demand in all oblasts as in the national model. For example, if 
telecommunications costs are x percent of the costs of nonferrous metals production in the national 
model, we assume that telecommunications costs are x percent of nonferrous metals costs in each of the 
oblasts. Demand for telecommunications from non-ferrous metals will differ across oblasts, however, 
since the share of total output attributable to non-ferrous metals differs across regions.  
We have total external exports and imports by oblast, as well as the commodity structure of 
external exports and imports by oblast for the year 2001 (Regions of Russia 2001, tables 23.1 and 23.2). 
We also have unpublished data supplied to us by Rosstat on inter-oblast exports and imports by sector. 
That is, for each of over 250 key commodities, we have an 88 by 88 matrix of bilateral trade flows among 
the oblasts. 
Supply and demand balance by oblast and by commodity requires adjustment of trade intensities. 
These adjustments assure that oblast exports and imports in aggregate are consistent with national import 
and export values, we have to adjust the oblast import and export intensities. We did this using a 
methodology that minimized the sum of squares of the difference between the original data on exports 
and imports and the adjusted exports and imports data, subject to the constraints of supply-demand 
balance and consistency with the national model data. Since we had greater confidence in the validity of 
the oblast output data than the inter-oblast trade flow matrix, in this optimization process, we fixed the 
output levels of the oblasts at the levels we had calculated above. We do not need to make any other 
adjustments, as the production technologies are assumed consistent across the regions. 
Since in every step of the process, we calculated oblast shares of the national input-output table, 
the process yields a set of 88 regional input-output tables which portray a regional disaggregation of the 
national input-output table. That is, summing over all the 88 input-output tables will yield the national 
input-output table, including wholesale and retail distribution margins, investment demand and 
government expenditure. Crucially, we may aggregate the 88 oblasts into a set of non-overlapping subsets 
and any such aggregation will yield a set of input-output tables that is fully consistent with the national 




We first employed the NOBUS survey to obtain the shares of workers working in multinationals 
service sectors in each business service sector in each oblast. We used this as a proxy for the share of 
output in each service sector in each oblast. We also obtained information from (1) our estimates from 
                                                      
22 We explain the methodology further in appendix A of Rutherford and Tarr (2006a). 
  17Russian service sector institutes of the share by sector of multinational ownership in the key services 
sectors;
 23 (2) Regions of Russia (2003) by Rosstat; and (3) the “BEEPS survey.  Only the NOBUS survey 
provides data that allows us to estimate shares of multinational ownership by both region and sector.  We 
thus start with our calculations based on the NOBUS information.  
When found, however, that when we aggregate the NOBUS shares across oblasts or sectors, the 
other three sources of information show considerably higher foreign ownership shares than the NOBUS 
survey.  We believe that the NOBUS survey estimates are too small, and adjust them. We adjusted our 
estimates from the NOBUS to be consistent with the estimates of the service sector institutes. The 
estimates of the service sector institutes are lower than those from the BEEPS or Regions of Russia, and 
thus involve less adjustment of the NOBUS data. We employed least squares adjustment of the NOBUS 
data so that the weighted average over all of Russia in each sector is consistent with the national estimates 
we received from the specialist service sector research institutes in Russia. This process will give as a 
structure of ownership based on the NOBUS survey, with the economy-wide average by sector 




Data for the households is taken from the NOBUS survey.
24  NOBUS is a cross section survey of 
Russian households, which was specially designed to measure the efficiency of the national social 
assistance programs by means of estimating the impact of social benefits and privileges on household 
welfare. The survey collects detailed information on household consumption and income, together with 
information on household demographics and labor market participation, access to health, education and 
social programs, and subjective perceptions of household welfare. The survey uses a random sample of 
44,529 households and 117,209 people. The sample is statistically representative at the national level and 
at the regional level for 47 out of the 89 regions (oblasts, territories, etc.) of the Russian Federation,
25 
where approximately 72 percent of the total population live. At the level of the federal okrug, a 
comparison of various characteristics from the NOBUS households with the national census, such as 
population by okrug, educational attainment, urban-rural decomposition, gender, decomposition, age 
profile and employment status, shows that the NOBUS survey is very close to the Russian census data 
                                                      
23 We thank the service sectors institutes in Russia mentioned above for these estimates. 
24 In Rutherford and Tarr (2006a) we employed the Household Budget Survey of Rosstat. The Household Budget 
Survey, however, is not publicly available, and has much less information on the sources of household income. 
25 The precision of statistical estimates across the regions will be lower than for Russia as the whole due to the 
smaller size of the sample in comparison with the national sample. In each of the 47 representative regions from 835 
to 943 households were interviewed, except for Moskovskaya oblast, where 398 households were interviewed. 
  18(see the NOBUS website). Thus, we believe that, at the seven federal okrug level, the NOBUS survey is 
adequately statistically representative to assess household impacts of WTO accession. The data, 
questionnaires, summary statistics, descriptions and explanations of the variables and studies that use the 
survey are publicly available on a World Bank website.
26 
  Based on the reported incomes from the NOBUS survey, for each of the seven regions, we 
grouped the households into deciles, from the poorest to the richest. For households within the same 
decile, we aggregated their data, to form ten representative households in each region, giving us 70 
representative households in all. We extracted the factor shares and consumption patterns for the 70 
representative households from these data as well.  
 
Reconciliation of the National Account and Household Budget Survey Data 
 
We have two sources of data for aggregate factor incomes: data from National Accounts and data 
from the NOBUS. In our Russian data, capital’s share of factor income is much larger in the National 
Account data than in the NOBUS. This is typical. Ivanic [2004] mapped income from the Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) surveys in 14 countries into factor shares and compared factor 
shares with the input-output tables in these countries. On average, capital’s share from the LSMS surveys 
was 21% of household income, but it was 52% of household income based on National Account 
information (based on the “GTAP” data set).   
We must produce a balanced Social Accounting Matrix in order to implement our integrated 
model, which means we must reconcile these differences. There are biases in both the collection of 
National Account and Household Survey data so that neither source is clearly correct. A key problem 
with the factor share data from the national accounts is that capital’s share is calculated residually in the 
input-output tables. Then in sectors where labor payments are underreported, the share of capital is biased 
up. On the other hand, income estimates from LSMS surveys are known to be less than income estimates 
from National Accounts. Deaton (2003) explains that one of the most likely explanations of the difference 
is that households fail to respond to the survey, and that the probability of non-response plausibly 
increases monotonically with income. This presumed pattern of non-response to the household survey 
would also help explain this difference in capital’s share, since the rich are likely to have more capital 
than the poor. 
                                                      
26 For details on the NOBUS dataset, please see: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/RUSSIANFEDERATIONEXTN/0,,conte
ntMDK:20919706~menuPK:2560592~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:305600,00.html 
  19We took total value added by sector from the National Accounts. We then set up a non-linear 
programming problem to obtain "new" factors shares for firms and households, where the new factor 
shares satisfy the conditions of a Social Accounting Matrix.  The new factors shares for firms and 
households are the values that minimize the sum of the squares of the differences between original and 
new factor shares from the national accounts plus sum of the squares of the differences between the 
original and new factor shares from the household data, subject to the constraint that the new data satisfy 
all the constraints of a Social Accounting Matrix. In our objective function, we apply equal weights to a 
departure from the original national accounts data and to a departure from the household income data, 
although we have done sensitivity analysis where we weight either the household data or the national 
accounts data more heavily. .This reconciliation of the two sets of data significantly decreased the share 
of capital reportedly paid by firms, especially in some of the more capital intensive sectors like ferrous 
and non-ferrous metals. 
 
III. Policy Results 
 
For each of our ten federal okrugs, we first discuss our central scenario (results are in table 13a). 
In our central scenario, we assume that tariffs on goods are cut by 50 percent, that barriers to foreign 
direct investment are eliminated or reduced (depending on the sector) and that seven industrial sectors 
receive an improvement in their market access between 0.5% and 1.5%.  See table 12a for details by 
sector. We present the overall welfare effects for each region, the impact on wages and returns to capital, 
the changes in exports and the real exchange rate and factor adjustment costs.  
The gains come from a combination of effects, so we also estimate the comparative static impacts 
of the various components to WTO accession in order to assess their relative importance. In order to 
obtain an assessment of the adjustment costs, we estimate the percentage of mobile labor and capital that 
must change industries. Next we discuss the estimates of the impact at the level of productive sectors of 
the economy.  In table 19, we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to some key parameters and 
present these results. A key aspect of the sensitivity analysis is how the results differ across regions when 
we assess the ability of different regions to attract FDI based on the ranking of their investment potential. 
Finally, we present results for all seventy representative households in table 20.  
Welfare Effects of WTO Accession—Household and Overall Results 
  
We have 70 representative households in our model: ten representative households in each of the 
seven regions.  We shall present welfare results for each of the 70 households, but in order to present 
  20aggregate welfare results, we must decide how we value the welfare of the representative households, 
relative to each other.  Given that each household in our model has a homothetic utility function (it is 
CES), it is possible to define a money measure of the value each household associates with WTO 
accession—its Hicksian equivalent variation. To arrive at a monetary value of what society as a whole 
places on the policy changes, what is most commonly done in applied general equilibrium is to weight all 
these equivalent variations equally. But this measure yields an aggregate welfare change that places no 
value on reduced inequality.  
  To allow for the possibility of a preference for less inequality, we specify a Social Welfare 
Function. With a Social Welfare Function, we can associate a dollar or ruble value to WTO accession that 
varies with society’s valuation of less inequality. We choose as our social welfare function a CES 
function of the utility functions of all the households. The CES form of the Social Welfare Function has 
several advantages. The elasticity of substitution parameter in the Social Welfare Function is a measure of 
society’s aversion to inequality.  The larger the elasticity of substitution, the less society cares about an 
equitable distribution of income. Well known ways of measuring social welfare are special cases of the 
CES. At one extreme (sigma = +inf in the table), the welfare of all households is valued equally. That is, 
each household has a dollar (or ruble) measure which is its Hicksian equivalent variation measure, where 
we simply sum the equivalent variations of all households to arrive at our measure society’s valuation of 
the policy changes. This is the so-called “utilitarian” Social Welfare Function. At the other extreme 
(sigma= 0), the welfare of the poorest household is the only welfare that is evaluated (the Rawlsian Social 
Welfare Function). Finally, with the CES, the value of the Social Welfare Function is equivalent to an 
equi-proportional increase in the equivalent variation of all households. (A formal derivation of this last 
property is shown in the appendix.) 
In table 13a, we present results, where we have made several choices in this regard. Household 
welfare changes are reported as household equivalent variation as a percent of household income. We 
report the value of the Social Welfare Function as a percent of GDP. With equal weights on households 
(sigma infinite), we show that the estimated weighted average of the welfare gains across all regions is 4.5 
percent of GDP or 8.1 percent of consumption. By region, the welfare gains as a percent of GDP range 
from 3.8 percent to 5.6 percent. 
  Our Social Welfare Function shows that the more weight we place on the poorest household, the 
lower is the overall welfare gain. For the sigma= 0, the gain to society is reduced to 2.4 percent of GDP. 
The poorest household in our data is the poorest household in Siberia. So with the Rawlsian measure of 
social welfare, the gain in that household’s welfare is also society’s valuation of the policy change. The 
poorest regions are also the regions that gain the least from WTO accession, i.e. the Urals and Siberia. So 
when we weight those households more highly, the welfare gains are less. 
  21Factor Returns. To better understand the distributional impacts, we need to examine factor 
earnings. All factors are immobile between okrugs, but within okrugs we have both mobile and specific 
capital. Skilled and unskilled labor are fully mobile within okrugs. Real wages of skilled and unskilled 
labor both increase by 5.1 percent on average over the entire economy. Moreover, in all okrugs, the 
increase in real wages of skilled labor is very close to the increase in the real wages of unskilled labor. 
Averaged over the country, the returns to regionally owned mobile capital increases by 7.6 percent and 
nationally owned mobile capital in the regions increases by 3.9 percent. Since all capital is nationally 
owned in our central scenario, the average return to mobile capital increases by about 5.7 percent.
27 Thus, 
the average return to mobile capital is slightly greater than and the return to skilled and unskilled labor. 
Since the rich have a greater percentage of their incomes coming from capital, this has a slightly 
regressive impact on the distribution of the gains; but since the differences are not large, the impact is not 
sharply regressive. On the other hand, owners of specific capital used by multinational firms see the 
returns to their capital increase by 102.7 percent on average over the seven okrugs, and this turns out to 
be important for rich households in regions that see significant expansion of multinational investment.  
Key to the results for returns to factors is to recognize that the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier endogenous 
productivity effect means that we escape the pessimism of Stolper-Samuelson trade liberalization—that 
is, the price of all factors of production may increase in real terms. Due to liberalization of barriers to 
FDI, the rental rate on specific capital for domestic firms declines, negatively impacting welfare across 
the regions. But the rental rate on specific capital for use in multinational firms increases, positively 
impacting welfare across regions.  
  Explaining Differences across Regions. The principal explanation for the differences across 
regions is the ability of the different regions to benefit from a reduction in barriers against foreign direct 
investment. Some regions may attract FDI much more easily than others.  A key parameter in our model 
is the initial share of multinational investment in each sector in each region. Multinational firms have 
widely different shares of the business services sectors in the different regions. A ten percent expansion of 
multinational firms will be a much larger absolute amount in a region that has substantial FDI initially. 
Thus, larger initial shares of FDI in a region will lead to larger absolute increases in FDI in the region 
when the barriers against FDI are reduced.  
In table 12b, we display our estimates of the shares of the industry captured by multinational 
firms. The two regions with the lowest welfare gains as a percent of GDP are the Urals and Siberia. But 
these two regions are the ones with the lowest shares of multinational investment. The Urals and Siberian 
                                                      
27 Each households share of the national capital fund is the proportion of the national capital earning held by that 
household. See the sensitivity analysis for an alternate modeling choice.   
  22share of FDI ranges from about 50 to 70 percent of the national average depending on the services sector. 
The three regions with the largest shares of multinational investment are the Northwest, Far East and 
Volga. The Northwest stands out as the region that gains the most, but, with estimated gains of 5.6 
percent and 5.3 percent, respectively, the Far East and Volga are also among the regions we estimate to 
gain the most. 
Regional differences in welfare as a percent of consumption will vary due to differences in 
regional savings rates. Consider two regions with the same or similar ratios of Hicksian equivalent 
variation to GDP (for example, the Urals and Siberia, or the South and the Central regions).  The South 
(and Urals) has a higher ratio of equivalent variation to consumption than the Central (and Siberia) 
because the South (Urals) has a greater share of savings. 
Household Effects. Unless otherwise indicated, in the remainder of this paper, when discussing 
aggregate welfare results across households, we shall refer to the utilitarian measure of social welfare 
where we simply sum the welfare changes of all households and report this as a percent of GDP. In table 
20, we present welfare results for all seventy households in the model where the Hicksian equivalent 
variation of each household is reported as a percent of its income. The range of gains is from between 3.5 
percent of income for poorest households in the Urals and Siberia to 6.1 percent for the richest household 
in the Northwest.
28 The primary explanation of differences across households is the region in which they 
live.  For reasons explained above, the household that gains the least in the Northwest, gains more as a 
percent of its income that the household that gains the most in the Urals or Siberia. Within regions there is 
a slight regressive effect from the slightly greater return to capital relative to labor. But for the richest 
households in the Northwest and the Far East, where there is a lot of multinational investment, specific 
capital owners with capital for use in the multinationals gain considerably, and the richest decile in these 
federal okrugs gains considerably more than the average.
 29 
Government Revenue and Real Exchange Rate Impacts. Due to the expansion of the 
economy, the government takes in additional revenue from value-added taxes and other indirect taxes, 
                                                      
28 The poorest household in the model is the poorest household in Siberia. The reader may have noticed, from table 
20, that the equivalent variation gains for this household are  3.5 percent of its income. But the Rawlsian  Social 
Welfare Function (which is based on the equivalent variation gains of  the poorest household in the model) reports a 
welfare gain of only 2.5 percent.  The reason for the difference is that the appropriate denominator for the 
household’s own equivalent variation is its own income. While the appropriate denominator in a social welfare 
function evaluation for a region in the income of the region. That is, 3.5= EV(1, S)/Y(1, S), where EV(1,S) is EV of 
the poorest household in Siberia and Y(1,S) is income of the poorest household in Siberia. And 2.5 = EV(1,S)/Y(av, 
S), where Y(av, S) is average income in Siberia. Our calculations show that  2.5/3.5 = Y(1, S)/ Y(av, S).    
29 A minority of the capital in the model is specific. The return to specific capital in domestic firms declines and the 
return to specific capital in multinational firms increases. There is also specific capital in energy sectors. On average 
the return to specific capital increases more than the return to labor, which explains why the richest decile of the 
population in each region gains slightly more than the other households.  
  23including export taxes. In order to hold government revenues constant, we assume that the government 
distributes back in a lump sum proportional manner the surplus revenue. 
Each region has an aggregate balance of trade constraint. Then the regional real exchange rate 
depreciates until the value of the increase in regional exports equals the value of increased regional 
imports. The percentage change in the overall value of increased international exports is presented in the 
table 13a and equals 8.8 percent in our central scenario.
30 The expansion of exports to other regions of 
Russia across regions ranges from a low of 0.6 percent from the Urals to a high of 2.4 percent in the 
Northwest and Central regions.
31 
Decomposition of Welfare Impacts from Exogenous Changes.  In order to assess what is 
causing these results we have undertaken several additional simulations in which we allow only one of 
the components of our WTO scenario to change, while holding others constant. First we assess the 
impact of foreign direct investment liberalization in business services.  We reduce barriers against 
FDI in the services sectors according to the cuts in table 12a, but there is no reduction in tariffs or 
improved market access. Russian commitments to reduce barriers against multinational service providers 
will allow multinationals to obtain greater after tax returns on their investments in Russia. This will 
encourage them to increase foreign direct investment to supply the Russian market. Although we expect 
some decline in the number of purely Russian owned businesses serving the services markets, on balance 
there will be additional service providers. Russian users of businesses services will then have improved 
access to the providers of services in areas like telecommunication, banking, insurance, transportation and 
other business services.  With equal weights of all households, we estimate that the gains to Russia from 
liberalization of barriers to FDI in services are about 7.3 percent of the value of Russian consumption or 
4.0 percent of the value of GDP. Thus, we estimate that about 88 percent of the total gains from Russian 
WTO accession come from the liberalization of barriers against FDI in the business services sectors.   
We also assess the impact of improved market access (according to the terms of trade 
improvements of table 12a), but we do not lower tariffs or barriers to FDI in services sectors, and we 
execute a scenario where we lower tariffs by 50 percent, but there is no liberalization of the barriers to 
FDI or improved market access. The combined estimated welfare gains of these two scenarios to the 
overall economy are 0.5 percent of GDP.  
                                                      
30 The change in the value of international exports must equal the change in the value of international imports. Since 
international exports exceed international imports in the benchmark equilibrium, the percentage change in exports is 
smaller than the percentage change in imports. 
31 Since the initial value of exports exceeds the initial value of imports in our data set, a smaller percentage increase 
in exports is equal in absolute dollar value to a larger percentage increase in imports. 
  24The gains to the economy from tariff reduction alone come about for two reasons:.(i) tariff 
reduction in Russia will lead to improved domestic resource allocation since tariff reduction will induce 
Russia to shift production to sectors where production is valued more highly based on world market 
prices. This impact, known as the “gains from trade” is the fundamental effect from trade liberalization 
and is often stressed by international trade economists; and (ii) tariff reduction will increase the 
profitability of exporting to Russia by imperfectly competitive foreign producers. More foreign firms will 
enter the Russian market until zero profits is restored. The additional varieties of foreign goods as inputs 
will increase Russian productivity in sectors that use these goods as inputs. 
 
Impact on the Productive Sectors  
For each region we have a balance of trade constraint and we assume that factors of production 
are mobile within the region with no change in aggregate employment of any factor. Consequently, the 
impacts on sectors are relative. That is, some sectors expand and some contract, but if employment in one 
sector expands, it must contract in another sector. 
Expanding Manufacturing Sectors.  Results for the manufacturing sectors that expand or 
contract depend on several industry characteristics. Sectors which are likely to expand are those that 
either: export a relatively large share of their output; obtain an exogenous increase in export prices as a 
result of WTO accession; are relatively unprotected initially compared to other sectors of the economy; or 
experience a significant reduction in the cost of their intermediate inputs, typically because they have a 
large share of intermediate inputs that come from sectors that produce additional varieties due to trade or 
FDI liberalization. 
The manufacturing sectors that we estimate will expand their output the most are ferrous metals 
(27 percent output increase), chemicals (18 percent output increase) and non-ferrous metals (12 percent 
output increase). These sectors expand substantially in the Urals, Central, Siberia, and Volga regions, 
where these sectors are concentrated.
32 These sectors are among those that we assume will gain an 
exogenous increase in the price of its exports upon WTO accession. They are also among those that 
                                                      
32 Table 5 shows that relative importance of these industries across okrugs. As a share of national value added in the 
sector, the Volga okrug has 40 percent of the chemicals value added; Urals has 32 percent of ferrous metals and 17 
percent of non-ferrous metals; Siberia has 44 percent of non-ferrous metals; and Central has 26 percent of ferrous 
metals and 28 percent of chemicals value added.  . 
  25export the highest share of their output—they all export over thirty percent of the value of their output on 
a national basis. Export intensity is important because a reduction in tariffs depreciates the real exchange 
rate. Since the real exchange rate depreciates, sectors that export intensively will gain an increase in the 
real value of their exports. 
  Declining Manufacturing Sectors. The sectors that contract the most are the sectors that are the 
most protected prior to tariff reduction and which have a relatively small share of exports. Most notably 
this includes food (14 percent output decline), construction materials (8 percent output decline), and the 
other goods producing sector (10 percent output decline).  We estimate declines in the output of all of 
these sectors in all regions. All of these sectors do little exporting and are among the sectors with tariff 
rates above ten percent. Textiles and apparel, with the highest tariff in the economy, also declines, but less 
significantly. But the export and import intensities vary across regions, so results differ across regions.  
  Business Services Sectors.  Russian business and labor interests in these sectors are diverse. Our 
central estimates are that skilled and unskilled employment will expand in several business services 
sectors, most notably telecommunications, truck transportation and railway transportation services.  The 
reason is that as a result of a reduction in the barriers to foreign direct investment in these sectors, we 
estimate that there will be an expansion in the number of multinational firms who locate in Russia to 
provide business services from within Russia, and a contraction in the number of purely Russian firms. 
But multinationals also demand Russian labor, even though they use Russian labor slightly less 
intensively than Russian firms.  But as more service firms enter the market, the quality adjusted price of 
services falls, and industries that use services expand their quantity demanded for business services. For 
telecommunications, truck transportation and railway transportation services, on balance, the increase in 
labor demand from the increase in the demand for business services exceeds the decline in labor demand 
from the substitution of multinational supply for Russian supply in the Russian market. Thus, we estimate 
that labor in these business services sectors will gain from an expansion in foreign direct investment and 
multinational provision of services in Russia.  
  26  These results are not uniform, however, as in maritime and financial services sectors we estimate 
a decline in employment. In these sectors the fact that multinationals use Russian labor less intensively 
dominates the impact of the greater use of business services.  
  Regarding capital, as a result of the removal of restrictions, we estimate there would be 
significant increase in foreign direct investment and an increase in multinational firms operating in 
Russia. We must be careful, however, in interpreting what this means for Russian firms. We define joint 
ventures between Russian firms and multinationals as a multinational firm. An estimated decline in 
Russian firms does not mean their capital moved to other sectors or disappears. In many cases, it means 
the Russian firms have become joint venture partners with a multinational firm in the same sector.  
Multinationals will often look for Russian joint venture partners when they want to invest in Russia. 
Many Russian companies providing business services are likely to see this as a profitable opportunity and 
will form joint ventures with multinationals. These Russian companies will become part of the expanding 
multinational share of the business services market. The Russian firms that become part of joint ventures 
with foreign investors will likely preserve or increase the value of their investments. Russian capital 
owners in business services who remain wholly independent of multinational firms, either because they 
avoid joint ventures or are not desired as joint venture partners, will likely see the value of their 
investments decline.  
This suggests that domestic lobbying interests within a service sector are very diverse regarding 
FDI liberalization. We estimate that labor should find it in their interest to support FDI liberalization even 
if capital owners in the sector oppose it. But capital owners themselves may have diverse interests 
depending on their prospects for acquisition by multinationals. 
 
IV. Sensitivity Analysis 
  In this section we execute numerous scenarios to examine how robust the results are to 
specification of the parameters of the model as well as to type of model that we use. Unless 
otherwise indicated, we will report results only from the case where we weight all households’ 
utility equally.    
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Sensitivity to Investment Potential of the Regions 
In our central scenario, results differ across regions due, to a significant extent, to the inherited 
FDI of the regions—the greater the initial FDI, the more the regions are capable of attracting new FDI for 
the same elasticities.  In this scenario, we augment the assessment of how regions may adapt and attract 
FDI based on the ranking of their investment potential. For investment potential ranking we use the 
rankings of Expert RA, which we explain in Appendix B of Rutherford and Tarr (2006b). We use the 
investment potential rankings to adjust a parameter in our model (etaf) that reflects the responsiveness 
(elasticity) of foreign investment supply to an increase in the price of their product in the region. We 
assign higher values of etaf to regions with above average investment potential rankings and conversely 
for low investment potential rankings. We present these results in the first row of new results in table 19, 
where we also indicate how the elasticity etaf varies across regions based on the investment rankings.   
The principal result is that the estimated gains for Volga increase and the estimated gains for the 
other regions decline.  Despite smaller estimated gains in this scenario, Far East and Northwest are still 
estimated to receive above average gains. The results suggest that the gains for a region could vary 
considerably depending on whether it succeeds in creating an atmosphere conducive to investment.   
 
Sensitivity to Results to a 50% Cut in the Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment 
We perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the extent of liberalization of barriers to foreign 
direct investment. In this scenario, we cut in the ad valorem tax equivalence of the barriers to FDI in the 
services sectors by 50 percent of the cut we executed in our central scenario, ,but we still allow for 
improved market access and a fifty percent cut in tariff barriers. The results are presented in table 13c, 
indicate that the gains to the economy are reduced to about 4.4 percent of consumption or 2.4 percent of 
GDP (with equal household weights). Northwest still has the largest estimated gains.   
 
Constant Returns to Scale 
  In this scenario we evaluate the impact of WTO accession in a traditional type CGE model with 
constant returns to scale and no foreign direct investment in services. As in our general WTO scenario, 
  28we reduce tariffs by 50 percent and improve the export prices of seven key sectors. Foreign direct 
investment in our model is based on a finite number of firms that only makes sense with imperfect 
competition. Thus, we know from our results above that the most important impact (liberalization of 
barriers against FDI in services) will be ignored in this scenario. Moreover, the productivity impact from 
additional varieties of goods in imperfectly competitive goods sectors will also be ignored.  
We find (see table 13e) that the overall welfare gains to the economy drop to only 0.1 percent of 
GDP, from 4.5 percent of consumption with our full model. This demonstrates that a traditional model 
that focuses on Harberger triangle type resource allocation gains from trade liberalization and terms of 
trade effects would miss the most important aspects of the impact of WTO accession on Russia.  
 
Calibration to the National Accounts or NOBUS Household Survey for Factor Shares 
In our central scenario, when we reconciled the national accounts and the household factor share 
data, we choose equal weighting between the two data sources. In table 13g we reconcile to the household 
survey data; that is, by choice of weights in our objective function, we allow the national accounts factor 
payment data to change and hold the household data unchanged to the extent possible.
33   In table 13h, we 
present results from the opposite approach. The household data is allowed to change to be consistent with 
the national accounts data.  
The estimated welfare gains are 4.5 percent of GDP or 8.1 percent of consumption. That is, the 
overall welfare impacts are virtually unaffected by the data source that is chosen.  
Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis 
In table 19, we present the impact on welfare of varying the value of key parameters. In these 
scenarios, we retain the central value of all parameters except the parameter in question. In general, the 
gains to the economy (welfare gains) increase with an increase in elasticities, since higher elasticities 
imply that the economy is able to more easily shift to sectors or products that are cheaper after trade and 
FDI liberalization.
34 There are two parameters in the table that have a strong impact on the results: the 
elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services (esubs) and the elasticity of 
multinational firm supply (etaf). A liberalization of the barriers to FDI will result in a reduction in the cost 
of business services, both from the direct effect of lowering the costs of doing business for multinational 
                                                      
33 No change in the household data was not a feasible solution, so we allowed a slight change in the household data. 
34 An increase in the elasticity of substitution between varieties reduces the welfare gain. This is because when 
varieties are good substitutes, additional varieties are worth less to firms and consumers.  
  29service providers and from the indirect effect that additional varieties of business services allow users to 
purchase a quality adjusted unit of services at less cost.  When the elasticity of substitution between 
value-added and business services is high (esubs = 2 in table 7), users have the greater potential to 
substitute the cheaper business services and this increases productivity. The elasticity of multinational and 
Russian firm supply (etaf, etad) is related to the share of capital that is sector specific for each firm type 
(foreign or domestic), but we also allow this parameter to vary with the ability of the federal okrug to 
attract capital. When etaf is high, a reduction in the barriers to foreign direct investment results in a larger 
expansion in the number of multinational firms supplying the Russian market, and hence more gains from 
additional varieties of business services.  In addition, the share of the services market captured by 





In this paper we have shown that all deciles of the Russian population can be expected to gain 
substantially from WTO accession. Although we estimate that all deciles of the populations in all regions 
of Russia will gain significantly, the results vary considerably across the regions of Russia depending on 
their ability to attract FDI. Their ability to attract FDI is partly related to geographic proximity to Western 
Europe or the Far East, as well as their policies and institutions that affect their investment climate. 
Households in the Northwest region gain the most, followed by households in the Far East and Volga 
regions. Households in Siberia and the Urals gain the least. Distribution impacts within regions are rather 
flat for the first nine deciles; but the richest decile of the population in the three regions that attract a lot of 
foreign investment gains significantly more than the other nine representative households in those 
regions. 
These results depend crucially on our model which incorporates endogenous productivity effects 
from additional varieties. Then the liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in business 
services, and to a lesser extent from tariff reduction in imperfectly competitive goods sectors, induces 
productivity growth in sectors that use these goods and services. We have shown that a traditional 
constant returns to scale model, by focusing on resource allocation and terms of trade effects, would miss 
the most important features of the trade and FDI liberalization that accompanies Russian WTO accession.  
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Table 1.  List of Sectors    
              
              
1.  Sectors where foreign direct investment from new multinational services providers is possible  
              
  RLW  Railway transportation       
  TRK  Truck transportation       
  PIP  Pipelines transportation       
  MAR  Maritime transportation       
  AIR  Air transportation       
  TRO  Other transportation       
  TMS  Telecommunications       
  SCI  Science & science servicing       
  FIN  Financial services        
              
2.  Sectors where new foreign firms may provide new goods from abroad 
              
  FME  Ferrous metallurgy       
  NFM  Non-ferrous metallurgy       
  CHM  Chemical & oil-chemical industry       
  MWO  Mechanical engineering & metal-working       
  TPP  Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry       
  CNM  Construction materials industry       
  FOO  Food industry       
  OTI  Other industries        
              
3.  Competitive sectors subject to constant returns to scale 
              
  HEA  Public services, culture and arts       
  AGR  Agriculture & forestry       
  COL  Coalmining       
  HOU  Housing and communal services       
  CON  Construction       
  ELE  Electric industry       
  GAS  Gas       
  34  CRU  Crude oil extraction       
  OIL  Oil refining and processing       
  OTH  Other goods-producing sectors        
  PST  Post       
  TRD  Wholesale and retail trade        
  CLI  Textiles and apparel       
 
  35Table 2.  List of Russian Federal Okrug and Oblasts
Federal Okrugs:
nor Northwestern Federal District ark,nen,kgd,len,kr,ko,mur,ngr,psk,spe,vlg
cen Central Federal District bel,bry,iva,klu,kos,krs,lip,mow,mos,orl,rya,smo,tam,tve,tul,vla,vor,yar
sou Southern Federal District ad,ast,ce da,in,kb,kl,kc,kda,se,sta,ros,vgg
vol Volga Federal District ba,cu,kir,me,mo,niz,ore,pnz,per,kop,sam,sar,ta,ud,uly
ura Urals Federal District kgn,sve,tyu,khm,yan,che
sib Siberian Federal District al,alt,bu,chi,agb,irk,uob,kk,kem,kya,eve,tay,nvs,oms,tom,ty
far Far Eastern Federal District  amu,yev,kam,kor,kha,mag,chu,pri,sa,sak
Administrative regions: Republics:
AMU Amurskaya oblast AD Adygeya, Respublika
ARK Arkhangel'skaya oblast AL Altay, Respublika
AST Astrakhanskaya oblast BA Bashkortostan, Respublika
BEL Belgorodskaya oblast BU Buryatiya, Respublika
BRY Bryanskaya oblast CE Chechenskaya Respublika
CHE Chelyabinskaya oblast* CU Chuvashskaya Respublika
CHI Chitinskaya oblast DA Dagestan, Respublika
IRK Irkutskaya oblast IN Ingushskaya Respublika
IVA Ivanovskaya oblast KB Kabardino-Balkarskaya Respublika
KGD Kaliningradskaya oblast KL Kalmykiya, Respublika
KLU Kaluzhskaya oblast KC Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya
KAM Kamchatskaya oblast KR Kareliya, Respublika
KEM Kemerovskaya oblast KK Khakasiya, Respublika
KIR Kirovskaya oblast KO Komi, Respublika Komi
KOS Kostromskaya oblast ME Mariy El, Respublika
KGN Kurganskaya oblast MO Mordoviya, Respublika
KRS Kurskaya oblast SA Sakha, Respublika [Yakutiya]
LEN Leningradskaya oblast SE Severnaya Osetiya, Respublika [Alaniya]
LIP Lipetskaya oblast TA Tatarstan, Respublika
MAG Magadanskaya oblast TY Tyva, Respublika [Tuva]
MOS Moskovskaya oblast UD Udmurtskaya Respublika
MUR Murmanskaya oblast
NIZ Nizhegorodskaya oblast Autonomous cities:
NGR Novgorodskaya oblast MOW Moskva
NVS Novosibirskaya oblast SPE Sankt-Peterburg
OMS Omskaya oblast
ORE Orenburgskaya oblast Autonomous regions:
ORL Orlovskaya oblast YEV Yevreyskaya avtonomnaya oblast
PNZ Penzenskaya oblast
PER Permskaya oblast Autonomous districts:
PSK Pskovskaya oblast AGB Aginskiy Buryatskiy avtonomnyy okrug
ROS Rostovskaya oblast CHU Chukotskiy avtonomnyy okrug
RYA Ryazanskaya oblast EVE Evenkiyskiy avtonomnyy okrug
SAK Sakhalinskaya oblast KHM Khanty-Mansiyskiy avtonomnyy okrug [Yugra]
SAM Samarskaya oblast KOP Komi-Permyatskiy avtonomnyy okrug
SAR Saratovskaya oblast KOR Koryakskiy avtonomnyy okrug
SMO Smolenskaya oblast NEN Nenetskiy avtonomnyy okrug
SVE Sverdlovskaya oblast TAY Taymyrskiy (Dolgano-Nenetskiy) avtonomnyy okrug
TAM Tambovskaya oblast UOB Ust-Ordynskiy Buryatskiy avtonomnyy okrug
TOM Tomskaya oblast YAN Yamalo-Nenetskiy avtonomnyy okrug
TUL Tul'skaya oblast
TVE Tverskaya oblast Administrative territories:
TYU Tyumenskaya oblast ALT Altayskiy kray
ULY Ul'yanovskaya oblast KHA Khabarovskiy kray
VLA Vladimirskaya oblast KDA Krasnodarskiy kray
VGG Volgogradskaya oblast KYA Krasnoyarskiy kray
VLG Vologodskaya oblast PRI Primorskiy kray
VOR Voronezhskaya oblast STA Stavropol'skiy kray
YAR Yaroslavskaya oblast
*
/ No data.  
  36Table 3.  Value Added in 2001 by Sector and Russian Federal Okrug
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East Sector Total
Railway transportation 25.3 67.4 21.2 47.1 36.6 32.4 10.8 240.7
Truck transportation 11.7 39.0 12.0 23.0 22.4 14.8 5.5 128.5
Pipelines transportation 1.9 3.8 2.1 7.1 7.9 2.7 0.8 26.2
Maritime transportation 4.0 9.0 3.8 9.1 10.9 6.9 1.7 45.4
Air transportation 3.4 17.0 4.5 6.1 6.6 5.3 1.7 44.6
Other transportation 5.4 18.7 5.7 11.2 10.4 6.6 2.4 60.4
Telecommunications 8.4 32.1 8.5 16.1 14.2 10.6 4.1 93.9
Science & science servicing 9.9 31.5 8.4 21.7 18.8 11.4 5.4 107.3
Financial services  52.9 197.3 47.2 97.5 90.4 66.6 27.0 578.9
Ferrous metallurgy 19.6 30.5 5.4 11.0 37.4 12.7 0.7 117.3
Non-ferrous metallurgy 15.6 11.3 5.4 13.5 37.9 98.8 42.1 224.7
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 11.0 34.8 10.0 48.8 3.6 14.2 0.8 123.4
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 38.8 131.4 20.8 129.8 32.3 24.6 16.9 394.7
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 33.7 21.1 3.2 15.8 3.3 15.0 4.6 96.6
Construction materials industry 5.5 28.0 7.8 13.4 6.9 6.5 1.8 70.0
Food industry 47.2 105.7 35.4 42.9 13.0 24.1 21.1 289.4
Other industries  5.7 32.2 4.6 12.2 1.6 3.4 0.9 60.6
Public services, culture and arts 41.1 153.2 36.1 74.3 59.0 48.0 21.3 433.1
Agriculture & forestry 33.5 125.1 110.5 144.4 33.9 82.7 19.4 549.3
Coalmining 2.9 0.1 1.5 0.0 1.0 29.7 4.3 39.5
Housing and communal services 20.3 81.6 20.1 36.6 24.3 24.2 10.1 217.2
Construction 44.3 202.6 89.4 127.0 48.4 48.2 10.1 570.0
Electric industry 21.6 64.2 18.5 46.0 32.3 28.8 10.4 221.8
Gas 0.3 1.0 2.0 36.4 0.2 0.2 40.1
Crude oil extraction 14.8 29.5 82.5 234.2 7.7 4.1 372.7
Oil refining and processing 7.0 13.2 7.4 31.8 3.1 13.8 3.8 80.1
Other goods-producing sectors  7.1 13.6 3.9 13.9 11.9 7.3 3.1 60.9
Post 2.4 8.8 2.4 4.7 4.0 2.9 1.2 26.5
Wholesale and retail trade  211.3 646.3 196.1 417.0 505.7 266.8 103.1 2346.3
Textiles and apparel 3.3 14.1 3.4 5.7 3.5 3.8 1.6 35.6
Okrug Total 710.1 2133.7 725.6 1512.1 1352.0 920.8 341.5
     (billions of 2001 rubles) 
a/
 
  37Table 4. Value-Added by Sector as a percent of the Value-Added of the Federal Okrug
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East Sector Total
Railway transportation 3.6 3.2 2.9 3.1 2.7 3.5 3.2 3.1
Truck transportation 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7
Pipelines transportation 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3
Maritime transportation 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.6
Air transportation 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6
Other transportation 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8
Telecommunications 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2
Science & science servicing 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.4
Financial services  7.5 9.2 6.5 6.4 6.7 7.2 7.9 7.5
Ferrous metallurgy 2.8 1.4 0.7 0.7 2.8 1.4 0.2 1.5
Non-ferrous metallurgy 2.2 0.5 0.7 0.9 2.8 10.7 12.3 2.9
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 1.6 1.6 1.4 3.2 0.3 1.5 0.2 1.6
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 5.5 6.2 2.9 8.6 2.4 2.7 5.0 5.1
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 4.7 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.2 1.6 1.4 1.3
Construction materials industry 0.8 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.9
Food industry 6.6 5.0 4.9 2.8 1.0 2.6 6.2 3.8
Other industries  0.8 1.5 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.8
Public services, culture and arts 5.8 7.2 5.0 4.9 4.4 5.2 6.2 5.6
Agriculture & forestry 4.7 5.9 15.2 9.5 2.5 9.0 5.7 7.1
Coalmining 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 3.2 1.3 0.5
Housing and communal services 2.9 3.8 2.8 2.4 1.8 2.6 3.0 2.8
Construction 6.2 9.5 12.3 8.4 3.6 5.2 2.9 7.4
Electric industry 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 2.4 3.1 3.0 2.9
Gas 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.7 0.0 0.1 0.5
Crude oil extraction 2.1 4.1 5.5 17.3 0.8 1.2 4.8
Oil refining and processing 1.0 0.6 1.0 2.1 0.2 1.5 1.1 1.0
Other goods-producing sectors  1.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8
Post 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
Wholesale and retail trade  29.8 30.3 27.0 27.6 37.4 29.0 30.2 30.5
Textiles and apparel 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
Okrug Total 9.2 27.7 9.4 19.6 17.6 12.0 4.4
     (percent)
 
  38Table 5. Share of Sector Value-Added by Federal Okrug of Russia
 
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Sector 
total
Railway transportation 10.5 28.0 8.8 19.6 15.2 13.5 4.5 3.1
Truck transportation 9.1 30.3 9.4 17.9 17.5 11.5 4.3 1.7
Pipelines transportation 7.1 14.4 8.2 26.9 30.1 10.2 3.1 0.3
Maritime transportation 8.8 19.9 8.4 20.0 24.0 15.2 3.8 0.6
Air transportation 7.7 38.2 10.0 13.6 14.7 12.0 3.9 0.6
Other transportation 8.9 31.0 9.5 18.5 17.2 11.0 4.0 0.8
Telecommunications 8.9 34.2 9.1 17.1 15.1 11.3 4.4 1.2
Science & science servicing 9.2 29.4 7.9 20.3 17.5 10.6 5.1 1.4
Financial services  9.1 34.1 8.1 16.8 15.6 11.5 4.7 7.5
Ferrous metallurgy 16.7 26.0 4.6 9.4 31.8 10.9 0.6 1.5
Non-ferrous metallurgy 7.0 5.0 2.4 6.0 16.9 44.0 18.7 2.9
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 8.9 28.2 8.1 39.6 2.9 11.5 0.7 1.6
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 9.8 33.3 5.3 32.9 8.2 6.2 4.3 5.1
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 34.8 21.9 3.3 16.3 3.4 15.5 4.8 1.3
Construction materials industry 7.9 40.0 11.2 19.2 9.9 9.2 2.6 0.9
Food industry 16.3 36.5 12.2 14.8 4.5 8.3 7.3 3.8
Other industries  9.5 53.1 7.5 20.1 2.7 5.6 1.5 0.8
Public services, culture and arts 9.5 35.4 8.3 17.2 13.6 11.1 4.9 5.6
Agriculture & forestry 6.1 22.8 20.1 26.3 6.2 15.0 3.5 7.1
Coalmining 7.3 0.3 3.8 0.1 2.6 75.0 11.0 0.5
Housing and communal services 9.3 37.6 9.3 16.8 11.2 11.1 4.7 2.8
Construction 7.8 35.5 15.7 22.3 8.5 8.5 1.8 7.4
Electric industry 9.7 28.9 8.3 20.8 14.6 13.0 4.7 2.9
Gas 0.7 2.5 4.9 90.8 0.5 0.6 0.5
Crude oil extraction 4.0 7.9 22.1 62.8 2.1 1.1 4.8
Oil refining and processing 8.7 16.5 9.3 39.7 3.9 17.3 4.7 1.0
Other goods-producing sectors  11.7 22.3 6.4 22.8 19.6 12.0 5.2 0.8
Post 9.2 33.1 9.0 17.7 15.2 11.1 4.5 0.3
Wholesale and retail trade  9.0 27.5 8.4 17.8 21.6 11.4 4.4 30.5
Textiles and apparel 9.4 39.6 9.5 16.1 9.9 10.8 4.6 0.5
Market total 9.2 27.7 9.4 19.6 17.6 12.0 4.4  
  39Table 6: Exports by Product and by Federal Okrug (in billions of 2001 rubles)
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Sector 
total
Railway transportation 8.8 13.9 5.5 14.7 8.8 14.1 3.9 69.7
Truck transportation 1.2 2.2 0.8 1.6 1.0 1.3 0.6 8.7
Pipelines transportation 1.1 0.1 2.3 6.4 19.6 0.7 0.4 30.6
Maritime transportation 7.3 11.2 5.8 16.1 18.0 9.7 3.1 71.2
Air transportation 6.1 25.1 6.4 10.8 7.9 7.2 3.1 66.5
Other transportation 1.2 2.8 1.0 2.9 1.9 1.6 0.5 11.9
Telecommunications 0.9 3.2 0.9 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.4 9.5
Science & science servicing 0.6 1.7 0.5 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 6.0
Financial services  0.7 2.5 0.6 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.4 7.4
Ferrous metallurgy 25.2 39.4 7.1 10.9 46.9 15.3 0.7 145.5
Non-ferrous metallurgy 21.2 15.3 7.7 19.8 51.6 116.3 36.7 268.6
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 13.6 25.3 8.3 54.6 5.0 20.4 0.3 127.5
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 27.4 87.1 15.5 54.2 20.3 31.6 10.5 246.7
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 27.0 2.8 0.9 6.3 1.1 19.2 9.0 66.3
Construction materials industry 0.6 2.1 0.6 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.1 6.7
Food industry 9.4 22.0 13.6 5.4 1.6 3.4 10.3 65.8
Other industries  2.1 12.0 1.7 4.5 0.6 1.3 0.3 22.6
Public services, culture and arts 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 2.8
Agriculture & forestry 0.6 2.4 2.1 2.7 0.6 1.6 0.4 10.4
Coalmining 1.5 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.5 15.3 2.2 20.5
Housing and communal services 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 3.0
Construction 2.5 11.3 5.0 7.1 2.7 2.7 0.6 31.8
Electric industry 0.9 2.7 0.8 2.0 1.4 1.2 0.4 9.4
Gas 0.2 0.7 1.3 25.0 0.1 0.2 27.5
Crude oil extraction 14.4 28.7 80.2 227.8 7.5 4.0 362.5
Oil refining and processing 16.8 31.7 17.8 76.5 7.5 33.3 9.1 192.7
Other goods-producing sectors  1.3 2.5 0.7 2.5 2.2 1.3 0.6 11.1
Post 0.3 1.2 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 3.8
Wholesale and retail trade  63.7 81.2 46.0 124.4 414.7 93.7 32.4 856.1
Textiles and apparel 1.5 6.2 1.5 2.5 1.6 1.7 0.7 15.7
Okrug Total: 258.8 410.4 183.9 514.5 874.0 405.3 131.7
 
  40Table 7. Sector Exports as a Percent of Total Exports of the Federal Okrug
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Sector 
total
Railway transportation 3.4 3.4 3.0 2.9 1.0 3.5 2.9 2.5
Truck transportation 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3
Pipelines transportation 0.4 0.0 1.2 1.2 2.2 0.2 0.3 1.1
Maritime transportation 2.8 2.7 3.2 3.1 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.6
Air transportation 2.4 6.1 3.5 2.1 0.9 1.8 2.4 2.4
Other transportation 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Telecommunications 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Science & science servicing 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Financial services  0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Ferrous metallurgy 9.7 9.6 3.9 2.1 5.4 3.8 0.6 5.2
Non-ferrous metallurgy 8.2 3.7 4.2 3.8 5.9 28.7 27.8 9.7
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 5.3 6.2 4.5 10.6 0.6 5.0 0.2 4.6
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 10.6 21.2 8.4 10.5 2.3 7.8 8.0 8.9
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 10.4 0.7 0.5 1.2 0.1 4.7 6.8 2.4
Construction materials industry 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
Food industry 3.6 5.4 7.4 1.1 0.2 0.8 7.8 2.4
Other industries  0.8 2.9 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.8
Public services, culture and arts 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Agriculture & forestry 0.2 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
Coalmining 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 3.8 1.7 0.7
Housing and communal services 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Construction 1.0 2.8 2.7 1.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.1
Electric industry 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Gas 0.1 0.4 0.3 2.9 0.0 0.1 1.0
Crude oil extraction 5.5 15.6 15.6 26.1 1.8 3.1 13.0
Oil refining and processing 6.5 7.7 9.7 14.9 0.9 8.2 6.9 6.9
Other goods-producing sectors  0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
P o s t 0 . 10 . 30 . 20 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 1 0 .
Wholesale and retail trade  24.6 19.8 25.0 24.2 47.4 23.1 24.6 30.8
Textiles and apparel 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6
Okrug Total: 9.3 14.8 6.6 18.5 31.5 14.6 4.7
1
 
  41Table 8.  Export Intensities by Federal Okrug
Sectoral Exports as a Percentage of Production
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Railway transportation 24.5 14.6 18.3 21.8 17.1 30.8 25.0
Pipelines transportation 21.5 1.2 37.3 31.7 89.8 9.4 15.1
Maritime transportation 81.8 63.0 76.1 79.9 91.1 73.9 82.1
Air transportation 48.3 45.9 45.9 48.3 43.1 44.9 48.8
Other transportation 11.7 7.6 9.2 13.1 9.2 12.7 10.0
Telecommunications 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.9 6.6 6.7 6.9
Science & science servicing 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7
Financial services  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Ferrous metallurgy 39.0 40.3 43.3 31.1 37.6 36.2 34.6
Non-ferrous metallurgy 53.7 56.5 57.6 57.8 52.9 46.0 34.6
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 41.1 25.3 26.8 34.8 50.8 46.9 20.4
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 29.1 27.4 29.7 15.6 24.4 47.2 24.1
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 31.9 5.9 12.2 16.0 13.6 48.8 71.7
Construction materials industry 4.4 3.0 3.0 3.9 6.2 6.4 2.8
Food industry 6.4 6.6 11.7 3.9 3.8 4.4 14.8
Other industries  14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3
Public services, culture and arts 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Agriculture & forestry 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Coalmining 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0
Housing and communal services 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Construction 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Electric industry 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Gas 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8
Crude oil extraction 55.9 55.9 55.9 55.9 55.9 55.9
Oil refining and processing 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1 32.1
Other goods-producing sectors  11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5
Post 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3
Wholesale and retail trade  21.6 9.0 16.8 21.3 58.7 25.1 22.5
Textiles and apparel 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
 
  42Table 9:  Imports by Product and by Federal Okrug (in x 2001 rubles)
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Sector 
total
Railway transportation 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.5
Truck transportation 0.4 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.2 4.3
Pipelines transportation
Maritime transportation
Air transportation 0.3 1.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 3.1
Other transportation 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.5
Telecommunications 0.7 2.7 0.7 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.4 8.0
Science & science servicing 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Financial services  1.6 5.8 1.4 3.0 2.6 1.9 0.8 17.1
Ferrous metallurgy 4.3 16.7 6.1 6.8 3.1 2.0 1.2 40.2
Non-ferrous metallurgy 3.4 11.0 3.1 4.6 2.8 1.2 0.7 26.7
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 12.3 49.1 6.6 14.0 9.3 14.2 4.7 110.4
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 58.0 192.9 26.0 35.7 30.6 13.9 14.5 371.5
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 5.3 21.2 3.1 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.5 32.4
Construction materials industry 3.0 12.9 2.3 3.6 1.7 2.9 0.6 27.0
Food industry 31.3 78.3 11.9 16.3 9.6 11.1 5.6 164.2
Other industries  0.8 2.5 0.9 1.7 1.1 1.0 0.4 8.4
Public services, culture and arts 1.0 3.8 0.9 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.5 10.7
Agriculture & forestry 3.7 12.5 4.4 6.4 3.0 3.9 1.8 35.8
Coalmining 0.6 1.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.3 0.3 5.1
Housing and communal services 3.5 14.2 3.5 6.4 4.2 4.2 1.8 37.9
Construction 9.8 23.3 9.0 16.9 20.9 8.6 5.6 94.0
Electric industry 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.1 3.0
G a s 0 . 10 . 30 . 10 . 20 . 30 . 10 . 0 1 .
Crude oil extraction 1.1 2.2 1.2 5.2 1.1 2.2 0.6 13.6
Oil refining and processing 3.5 10.5 3.5 7.4 5.4 4.1 1.5 36.0
Other goods-producing sectors  1.6 5.4 1.5 3.3 3.0 2.0 0.8 17.6
P o s t 0 . 10 . 20 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 0 0 .
Wholesale and retail trade  1.0 3.4 1.0 2.1 2.1 1.3 0.5 11.5
Textiles and apparel 25.9 108.8 26.0 44.4 27.3 29.7 12.7 274.8




  43Table 10.  Sector Imports as a Percent of Total Imports of the Federal Okrug
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Sector 
total
Railway transportation 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Truck transportation 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3
Pipelines transportation
Maritime transportation
Air transportation 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
Other transportation 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Telecommunications 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6
Science & science servicing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Financial services  0.9 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.3
Ferrous metallurgy 2.5 2.9 5.3 3.7 2.3 1.8 2.2 3.0
Non-ferrous metallurgy 1.9 1.9 2.7 2.5 2.1 1.1 1.2 2.0
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 7.1 8.4 5.8 7.5 6.9 13.0 8.4 8.1
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 33.3 33.1 22.6 19.2 22.7 12.6 25.8 27.4
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 3.0 3.6 2.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.8 2.4
Construction materials industry 1.7 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.3 2.7 1.1 2.0
Food industry 18.0 13.4 10.3 8.8 7.2 10.1 10.0 12.1
Other industries  0.4 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6
Public services, culture and arts 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.8
Agriculture & forestry 2.1 2.2 3.8 3.4 2.2 3.6 3.3 2.6
Coalmining 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.5 0.4
Housing and communal services 2.0 2.4 3.0 3.4 3.2 3.8 3.1 2.8
Construction 5.6 4.0 7.8 9.1 15.5 7.8 9.9 6.9
Electric industry 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
G a s 0 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 20 . 10 . 1 0 .
Crude oil extraction 0.7 0.4 1.1 2.8 0.9 2.0 1.0 1.0
Oil refining and processing 2.0 1.8 3.1 4.0 4.0 3.7 2.7 2.6
Other goods-producing sectors  0.9 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.2 1.8 1.4 1.3
P o s t 0 . 00 . 00 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 10 . 1 0 .
Wholesale and retail trade  0.6 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.8
Textiles and apparel 14.9 18.7 22.6 23.9 20.3 27.1 22.6 20.2




  44Table 11.  Sector Import Intensities by Federal Okrug
Regional Imports of the Sector as a Percent of Regional Consumption of the Product
Sector 
b/ Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Railway transportation 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
Truck transportation 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Pipelines transportation
Maritime transportation
Air transportation 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
Other transportation 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2
Telecommunications 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
Science & science servicing 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Financial services  1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Ferrous metallurgy 20.7 24.1 31.3 11.0 12.1 9.1 13.6
Non-ferrous metallurgy 18.2 21.2 25.2 11.4 11.5 8.7 10.0
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 37.0 45.7 21.2 20.4 19.7 36.3 30.2
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 50.6 57.6 22.6 17.2 15.7 11.5 24.4
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 28.7 32.2 16.3 3.3 3.5 2.3 6.0
Construction materials industry 17.6 18.7 8.5 8.4 8.3 15.6 11.3
Food industry 36.0 21.0 12.8 10.6 9.8 10.6 12.7
Other industries  5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
Public services, culture and arts 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Agriculture & forestry 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Coalmining 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Housing and communal services 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9
Construction 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6
Electric industry 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Gas 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Crude oil extraction 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Oil refining and processing 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
Other goods-producing sectors  16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7
Post 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Wholesale and retail trade  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Textiles and apparel 62.1 62.1 62.1 62.1 62.1 62.1 62.1
 
  45Table 12a.  Tariff Rates, Export Tax Rates, Market Access and Ad Valorem Equivalence of Barriers to FDI 
Tariff rates Export tax rates







Maritime transportation 95.0 80.0
Air transportation 90.0 75.0
Other transportation 33.0
Telecommunications 33.0
Science & science servicing 0.1 33.0
Financial services  36.0
Ferrous metallurgy 5.9 2.6 0.5
Non-ferrous metallurgy 8.5 5.1 0.5
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 7.5 3.6 0.5
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 10.7 2.4
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 13.5 11.0
Construction materials industry 12.0 6.3
Food industry 14.1 2.9 0.5
Other industries  14.6 1.1 0.5
Public services, culture and arts 0.1
Agriculture & forestry 8.4 2.3
Coalmining 2.2 2.1
Housing and communal services
Construction 0.3
Electric industry 2.6 6.2
Gas 5.0 38.7
Crude oil extraction 21.2
Oil refining and processing 4.5 28.6
Other goods-producing sectors  14.6 1.1 0.5
Post
Wholesale and retail trade  0.7
Textiles and apparel 16.8 3.7
Source: Tarr, Shepotylo and Koudoyarov (2005) for tariff rates; Kimura et al. (2004a,b,c) for barriers to FDI; Roskomstat for export tax rates; authors' 
estimates for change in world market prices.
ad-valorem equivalent, %
 
  46Table 12b.  Shares of Business Services Sectors in the Regions of Russia Captured by Multinational Firms 
Sector Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
National 
Average
Railway transportation 6.0 3.1 3.8 6.0 1.7 2.2 6.0 3.0
Truck transportation 10.0 6.5 6.2 10.0 3.1 4.7 10.0 5.0
Pipelines transportation 6.0 4.8 4.6 6.0 1.8 3.4 6.0 3.0
Maritime transportation 70.0 40.6 45.6 70.0 15.1 28.3 70.0 35.0
Air transportation 50.0 34.8 29.9 50.0 15.5 26.2 50.0 25.0
Other transportation 8.0 5.3 5.0 8.0 2.5 4.0 8.0 4.0
Telecommunications 30.0 19.8 18.8 30.0 8.8 15.1 30.0 15.0
Science & science servicing 20.0 8.9 10.0 20.0 7.0 8.8 20.0 10.0
Financial services  20.0 9.3 9.0 20.0 3.8 6.6 20.0 10.0
ad-valorem equivalent, %
 
  47Table 13a.  Impact of WTO Accession on Federal Okrugs
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Social Welfare Indices (ev/GDP)
sigma=0 2.4 3.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 1.8 2.5 3.7
sigma=1 3.8 4.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 2.7 3.1 4.5
sigma=4 4.3 5.4 4.2 4.3 4.6 3.6 3.6 4.9
sigma=+inf 4.5 5.6 4.4 4.5 4.9 3.9 3.8 5.1
ev/C 8.1 10.6 7.0 8.1 9.1 9.6 6.4 10.0
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 3.5 4.7 3.5 2.5 3.3 1.7 1.7 3.6
Regional exports (% change) 1.8 2.4 2.4 1.6 1.9 0.6 1.3 2.3
Real exchange rate (% change) 2.6 3.3 2.8 2.6 2.7 1.9 1.7 2.9
International exports (% change) 8.8 12.3 16.2 10.2 12.3 2.7 8.6 9.6
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  5.1 6.7 5.0 5.0 5.4 4.2 4.2 6.3
Skilled labor  5.1 6.8 4.9 5.0 5.7 4.2 4.3 6.3
Aggregate capital earnings 3.9 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.2 3.0 4.1
Regional mobile capital  7.6 11.0 9.1 7.3 8.2 4.9 6.4 8.8
Energy sector resources 3.0 6.0 15.6 4.9 5.2 1.4 7.7 8.5
Specific capital in domestic firms -25.7 -26.0 -27.7 -27.4 -25.8 -22.7 -22.3 -25.5
Specific capital in multinational firms 102.7 66.7 73.7 126.2 147.0 184.7 164.8 121.0
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 2.3 3.0 2.2 1.7 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.4
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 2.7 3.3 2.8 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.8
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
 
  48Table 13b.  Impact of Full Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization in Services
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Social Welfare Indices (ev/GDP)
sigma=0 2.9 3.7 3.2 3.1 3.6 1.9 3.1 3.8
sigma=1 3.7 4.3 3.6 3.6 4.3 2.3 3.4 4.2
sigma=4 4.0 4.7 3.8 3.8 4.7 2.7 3.7 4.5
sigma=+inf 4.0 4.8 3.9 3.9 4.9 2.9 3.8 4.6
ev/C 7.3 9.1 6.2 7.1 9.1 7.1 6.5 9.1
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 2.0 2.5 1.8 1.4 2.2 1.4 1.3 2.3
Regional exports (% change) 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.3
Real exchange rate (% change) 1.2 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.4 0.9 1.1 1.6
International exports (% change) 2.6 3.8 3.8 1.4 3.6 1.6 1.9 3.4
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  4.1 5.2 3.7 3.8 5.3 2.4 3.6 5.5
Skilled labor  2.7 4.1 2.3 2.5 4.0 1.4 2.3 4.0
Aggregate capital earnings 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.8 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.3
Regional mobile capital  4.6 6.1 5.2 4.6 5.4 2.9 3.7 5.5
Energy sector resources 3.2 4.6 7.8 3.4 4.2 2.5 6.4 6.6
Specific capital in domestic firms -21.6 -20.3 -22.6 -23.6 -20.7 -22.3 -19.9 -21.6
Specific capital in multinational firms 88.5 60.3 64.5 102.9 128.1 153.7 138.1 103.7
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.9
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.6
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
 
  49Table 13c.   Impact of Partial Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization in Services
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Social Welfare Indices (ev/GDP)
sigma=0 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.8
sigma=1 2.0 2.6 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.3
sigma=4 2.3 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2 1.8 2.5
sigma=+inf 2.4 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.4 1.9 2.6
ev/C 4.4 5.7 4.1 4.5 4.2 6.0 3.3 5.1
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 2.1 3.2 2.3 1.4 1.8 0.6 0.6 2.1
Regional exports (% change) 0.9 1.5 1.5 0.8 1.2 -0.3 0.2 1.1
Real exchange rate (% change) 1.8 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.0 1.8
International exports (% change) 7.0 10.4 12.8 8.6 10.5 1.5 6.9 7.9
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  2.0 2.9 2.1 2.2 1.6 2.2 1.4 2.3
Skilled labor  2.4 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.6 2.0 2.7
Aggregate capital earnings 2.6 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.6
Regional mobile capital  4.8 7.5 6.2 4.5 4.9 3.0 4.0 5.8
Energy sector resources 0.6 2.8 9.2 2.3 2.5 -0.6 2.6 3.5
Specific capital in domestic firms -12.1 -14.2 -13.4 -12.2 -14.0 -6.5 -8.8 -13.0
Specific capital in multinational firms 43.1 29.2 30.0 55.2 66.9 66.5 66.3 57.2
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 2.1 2.6 2.0 1.5 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.3
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 2.1 2.6 2.1 1.5 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.4
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
 
  50Table 13d.   Impact of Improved External Market Access
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Social Welfare Indices (ev/GDP)
sigma=0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.2
sigma=1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.1
sigma=4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.3 -0.1
sigma=+inf 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.3 -0.1
ev/C 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 -0.5 -0.1
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
Regional exports (% change) -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3
Real exchange rate (% change) -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.9 -0.6
International exports (% change) 0.5 1.1 1.4 0.5 1.0 -0.3 1.0 -0.6
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.4
Skilled labor  0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.1
Aggregate capital earnings 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1
Regional mobile capital  0.4 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.6 0.4
Energy sector resources -2.6 -2.0 0.3 -2.0 -2.3 -2.9 -1.9 -1.8
Specific capital in domestic firms -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 1.4 0.0 0.4
Specific capital in multinational firms 1.7 0.5 0.7 3.0 2.0 5.2 4.5 2.4
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.0
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.2 1.3
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
 
  51Table 13e.   Impact of Tariff Reductions
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Social Welfare Indices (ev/GDP)
sigma=0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.1
sigma=1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.4
sigma=4 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5
sigma=+inf 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.5
ev/C 0.7 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.0 1.2 0.4 1.0
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 1.4 2.0 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.0
Regional exports (% change) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.2
Real exchange rate (% change) 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.7
International exports (% change) 5.5 7.2 10.1 7.5 7.3 1.5 5.7 7.6
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  1.0 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.2 1.2
Skilled labor  1.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.1
Aggregate capital earnings 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.5
Regional mobile capital  2.4 3.7 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.8
Energy sector resources 2.4 3.4 6.1 3.6 3.5 1.9 2.3 2.5
Specific capital in domestic firms -3.5 -4.4 -4.1 -3.0 -4.3 -1.6 -2.0 -4.2
Specific capital in multinational firms 10.6 4.7 7.2 17.3 14.2 21.2 19.5 13.4
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.9
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.9 1.5
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
 
  52Table 13f.   Impact of FDI Liberalization,  Market Access and Tariff Reform in a CRTS Framework
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Social Welfare Indices (ev/GDP)
sigma=0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2
sigma=1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.0
sigma=4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.1
sigma=+inf 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2
ev/C 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.9 -0.1 0.3
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 1.1 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5
Regional exports (% change) -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
Real exchange rate (% change) 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1
International exports (% change) 2.2 2.7 4.7 3.2 3.0 0.5 2.2 2.4
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  1.3 1.7 1.5 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2
Skilled labor  1.6 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5
Aggregate capital earnings 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2
Regional mobile capital  1.8 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.9
Energy sector resources 1.1 1.4 2.8 1.6 1.6 0.9 1.3 1.1
Specific capital in domestic firms -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.5 -1.0 0.2 0.1 -0.4
Specific capital in multinational firms 1.0 0.3 0.4 2.3 1.5 2.7 1.8 1.3
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
 
  53Table 13g. Impact of WTO Accession on Federal Okrugs (calibration to household factor shares)
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Social Welfare Indices (ev/GDP)
sigma=0 2.3 4.6 4.1 3.1 2.7 1.9 2.5 4.2
sigma=1 4.0 5.4 4.5 3.8 3.8 2.6 2.8 4.6
sigma=4 4.4 5.9 4.7 4.2 4.4 3.3 3.1 4.9
sigma=+inf 4.5 6.0 4.7 4.3 4.6 3.5 3.2 5.1
ev/C 8.1 11.3 7.6 7.8 8.7 8.6 5.5 10.0
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 3.5 4.7 3.3 2.4 3.3 1.6 1.8 3.6
Regional exports (% change) 1.8 2.6 2.5 1.6 1.8 0.7 1.2 2.3
Real exchange rate (% change) 2.6 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.6 1.8 1.6 2.8
International exports (% change) 8.9 12.0 16.8 10.1 12.1 3.0 9.1 9.3
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  6.3 8.4 7.4 5.8 5.7 4.8 4.5 7.3
Skilled labor  5.4 7.1 5.6 5.2 5.8 4.4 4.1 6.4
National capital 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.3 1.1 2.3
Regional mobile capital  7.3 12.4 10.0 7.6 8.5 4.6 6.7 9.7
Energy sector resources 3.0 6.1 16.0 4.8 5.0 1.5 7.8 8.2
Specific capital in domestic firms -25.8 -26.3 -27.9 -27.5 -25.6 -22.8 -22.2 -25.3
Specific capital in multinational firms 103.1 67.0 74.3 126.8 147.0 185.2 164.5 121.4
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 2.0 2.8 1.6 1.6 2.5 2.0 2.1 1.9
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 2.7 3.5 2.7 2.0 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.8
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
 
  54Table 13h. Impact of WTO Accession on Federal Okrugs (calibration to input-output factor shares)
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Social Welfare Indices (ev/GDP)
sigma=0 2.4 3.6 2.8 2.8 2.6 1.7 2.5 3.6
sigma=1 3.8 4.7 3.9 3.8 3.8 2.7 3.1 4.4
sigma=4 4.3 5.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 3.5 3.6 4.8
sigma=+inf 4.5 5.4 4.5 4.5 4.8 3.8 3.8 5.0
ev/C 8.1 10.3 7.2 8.1 8.9 9.4 6.5 9.8
Aggregate trade
Regional terms of trade (% change) 3.4 4.6 3.4 2.5 3.3 1.8 1.7 3.5
Regional exports (% change) 1.8 2.5 2.4 1.6 1.9 0.6 1.3 2.3
Real exchange rate (% change) 2.7 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.7 1.9 1.8 2.9
International exports (% change) 8.9 13.0 16.6 10.4 12.4 2.6 8.6 9.9
Return to primary factors (% change)
Unskilled labor  5.0 6.6 4.9 5.0 5.3 4.1 4.1 6.3
Skilled labor  5.2 7.1 5.0 5.2 5.8 4.1 4.5 6.5
National capital 4.3 5.0 4.5 4.2 4.3 3.5 3.3 4.5
Regional mobile capital  7.0 9.6 7.4 6.6 7.8 4.9 6.1 8.0
Energy sector resources 3.1 6.6 15.9 5.1 5.4 1.4 7.6 8.7
Specific capital in domestic firms -25.7 -26.1 -27.7 -27.4 -25.8 -22.6 -22.2 -25.5
Specific capital in multinational firms 103.2 67.0 74.2 126.9 147.4 185.2 165.4 121.4
Factor adjustments
Unskilled labor (% changing sectors) 2.3 2.9 2.2 1.7 2.5 2.0 2.2 2.5
Skilled labor (% changing sector) 2.6 3.3 2.7 2.0 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.9
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
 
  55Table 14a.  Decomposition of Regional Welfare Impacts for the Federal Okrugs - WTO Scenario 
Component effects on utilitarian SWF
Overall 
average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Skilled wages 1.1 1.6 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.3
Unskilled wages 1.4 2.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.6
Capital Earnings
Mobile capital 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.6 3.2
Regional energy rents 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Specific capital in domestic firms -2.2 -2.0 -2.3 -2.1 -1.9 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3
Specific capital in multinational firms 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3
Tax and Terms of Trade Effects
Change in lumpsum taxes 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Total Welfare Change (% income) 4.9 6.2 4.9 4.9 5.3 4.1 4.1 5.6
-9.E-08 -8.E-09 -6.E-08 1.E-07 2.E-08 8.E-08 -2.E-08
Source: Authors' estimates  
  56Table 14b.  Decomposition of Average Decile Welfare Impacts  - WTO Scenario 
Component effects on utilitarian SWF
Average 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Skilled wages 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9
Unskilled wages 1.4 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
Capital Earnings
Mobile capital 2.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.7
Regional energy rents 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Specific capital in domestic firms -2.2 -0.9 -1.1 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -1.8 -1.9 -2.2
Specific capital in multinational firms 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2
Tax and Terms of Trade Effects
Change in lumpsum taxes 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Total Welfare Change (% income) 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.8




  57Table 15.  Impact of WTO Accession on Output by Sector and Federal Okrug
change from base year, (%)
Sector
National 
Average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Railway transportation 1.7 2.4 1.4 1.1 1.9 3.3 0.2 0.6
Truck transportation 7.6 11.4 8.0 7.2 11.4 1.5 5.4 11.6
Pipelines transportation -3.7 -4.8 -4.2 -3.6 -3.7 -2.7 -5.1 -5.0
Maritime transportation -5.5 -4.4 -5.0 -6.8 -3.6 -4.2 -11.6 -3.4
Air transportation -2.0 -0.6 -2.8 -1.9 1.9 -3.4 -5.6 0.8
Other transportation -7.6 -1.5 -7.1 -7.5 -1.6 -17.5 -11.0 -1.5
Telecommunications 9.7 17.4 9.7 9.2 17.2 -2.4 4.7 17.3
Science & science servicing 2.2 5.2 0.1 0.1 6.8 -0.8 1.5 4.7
Financial services  -6.3 -5.8 -6.3 -5.8 -6.1 -6.6 -6.6 -6.3
Ferrous metallurgy 27.2 27.5 36.1 46.0 23.7 23.6 12.6 22.2
Non-ferrous metallurgy 11.7 4.7 25.8 34.7 23.7 28.7 5.7 2.9
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 17.8 23.4 8.4 11.0 20.3 56.8 23.1 1.3
Mechanical engineering & metal-working -2.8 -0.4 -2.3 0.1 -5.0 -3.4 0.1 -1.3
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry -3.5 -4.5 -11.5 -9.5 -0.3 0.1 -4.4 28.0
Construction materials industry -7.8 -10.7 -8.7 -5.3 -5.6 -5.6 -11.6 -7.1
Food industry -13.7 -16.4 -15.9 -10.9 -11.5 -8.0 -12.8 -11.6
Other industries  -2.9 -2.7 -1.4 -2.4 -6.1 -2.0 -6.5 -4.8
Public services, culture and arts 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.7
Agriculture & forestry -3.6 -8.3 -3.5 -2.2 -4.2 1.5 -4.2 -5.4
Coalmining 4.7 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.9 6.2 4.1 6.4
Housing and communal services 1.8 2.2 1.5 2.3 1.7 2.4 1.0 2.4
Construction 0.5 -0.8 2.5 0.3 -0.9 -0.5 -1.6 -0.8
Electric industry 2.2 2.5 1.3 2.0 2.5 4.3 1.8 0.9
Gas -1.6 -2.7 -1.6 -1.5 -1.6 -2.6 -1.9
Crude oil extraction 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.8 0.9 0.9 1.7
Oil refining and processing 0.9 -1.2 0.6 2.2 3.1 0.1 -3.6 2.2
Other goods-producing sectors  -9.6 -11.9 -4.3 -7.5 -11.5 -10.2 -12.7 -12.0
Post 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.5 -0.3 0.6 2.0
Wholesale and retail trade  3.6 5.5 4.4 4.1 5.0 0.0 4.0 4.8
Textiles and apparel -3.0 -4.6 -2.6 -2.3 -3.0 -2.0 -5.1 -2.5
 
  58Table 16.  Impact of WTO Accession on Skilled Employment by Sector and Federal Okrug
change from base year, (%)
Sector
National 
Average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Railway transportation 1.5 2.0 1.1 1.0 1.9 3.2 0.3 0.3
Truck transportation 7.0 10.4 7.3 6.5 10.6 1.2 5.0 10.6
Pipelines transportation -4.1 -4.5 -3.4 -4.0 -4.4 -3.6 -5.2 -5.8
Maritime transportation -6.5 -6.0 -6.2 -7.8 -4.9 -4.9 -12.1 -4.9
Air transportation -3.3 -2.2 -3.9 -3.0 0.2 -4.1 -6.5 -0.7
Other transportation -8.0 -2.3 -7.8 -8.0 -2.3 -17.9 -11.2 -2.5
Telecommunications 9.8 17.4 9.5 9.3 17.4 -2.4 5.1 17.2
Science & science servicing 1.7 4.4 -0.3 -0.4 6.3 -1.0 1.3 4.0
Financial services  -9.1 -9.6 -9.0 -8.7 -9.8 -8.7 -8.9 -10.1
Ferrous metallurgy 28.3 27.6 36.1 46.0 23.8 23.5 13.0 21.9
Non-ferrous metallurgy 12.2 5.5 26.6 35.2 24.3 28.7 6.3 3.2
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 17.3 23.7 8.4 11.2 20.5 56.8 23.6 1.2
Mechanical engineering & metal-working -4.0 -2.3 -3.5 -1.1 -6.5 -4.3 -0.6 -3.0
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry -3.9 -5.2 -11.9 -9.9 -0.7 -0.1 -4.3 27.4
Construction materials industry -8.1 -10.8 -9.0 -5.3 -5.5 -5.7 -11.3 -7.3
Food industry -13.7 -16.0 -15.6 -10.6 -11.0 -7.9 -12.2 -11.3
Other industries  -3.0 -3.3 -1.6 -2.7 -6.4 -2.1 -6.6 -5.1
Public services, culture and arts 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.3
Agriculture & forestry -2.6 -6.9 -2.1 -1.4 -3.2 1.7 -3.3 -4.5
Coalmining 6.9 9.5 10.3 10.0 10.1 10.1 5.9 9.1
Housing and communal services 2.5 3.2 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.5 1.7 3.0
Construction 0.4 -1.2 2.1 0.1 -1.1 -0.7 -1.5 -1.1
Electric industry 2.3 2.8 1.5 2.2 2.7 4.2 2.2 1.0
Gas -16.5 -27.2 -18.4 -20.5 -16.1 -23.2 -22.5
Crude oil extraction -0.5 -1.3 0.2 0.1 -0.7 -1.5 -0.5
Oil refining and processing 2.0 0.3 1.9 3.1 4.2 0.3 -2.6 3.1
Other goods-producing sectors  -10.1 -12.9 -5.1 -8.2 -12.3 -10.7 -13.1 -12.9
Post -0.9 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -1.2 -2.1 -1.2 -0.9
Wholesale and retail trade  3.7 5.6 5.0 3.6 4.2 -0.8 3.9 3.9
Textiles and apparel -3.0 -4.6 -2.6 -2.3 -3.0 -2.0 -4.9 -2.5
Source: Authors' calculations.
 
  59Table 17.  Impact of WTO Accession on Unskilled Employment by Sector and Federal Okrug
change from base year, (%)
Sector
National 
Average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Railway transportation 1.5 2.1 1.0 1.0 2.1 3.2 0.5 0.2
Truck transportation 7.1 10.5 7.2 6.5 10.9 1.2 5.1 10.6
Pipelines transportation -4.0 -4.4 -3.5 -4.0 -4.1 -3.6 -5.1 -5.8
Maritime transportation -6.5 -5.9 -6.3 -7.8 -4.7 -4.9 -12.0 -5.0
Air transportation -3.3 -2.1 -4.0 -3.0 0.5 -4.1 -6.4 -0.8
Other transportation -7.8 -2.2 -7.9 -8.0 -2.0 -17.9 -11.1 -2.5
Telecommunications 10.0 17.5 9.3 9.3 17.8 -2.4 5.2 17.1
Science & science servicing 1.7 4.6 -0.5 -0.4 6.6 -1.0 1.5 4.0
Financial services  -9.1 -9.5 -9.1 -8.7 -9.5 -8.7 -8.8 -10.1
Ferrous metallurgy 28.8 27.7 35.9 46.0 24.2 23.5 13.1 21.9
Non-ferrous metallurgy 12.3 5.6 26.4 35.2 24.7 28.7 6.5 3.1
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 17.0 23.8 8.3 11.2 20.9 56.8 23.8 1.2
Mechanical engineering & metal-working -3.9 -2.2 -3.6 -1.1 -6.2 -4.2 -0.5 -3.1
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry -3.9 -5.0 -12.0 -9.9 -0.4 -0.1 -4.2 27.4
Construction materials industry -8.1 -10.7 -9.1 -5.3 -5.3 -5.7 -11.2 -7.3
Food industry -13.7 -15.9 -15.7 -10.6 -10.7 -7.8 -12.1 -11.3
Other industries  -3.0 -3.1 -1.7 -2.7 -6.2 -2.1 -6.5 -5.2
Public services, culture and arts 1.2 1.5 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.2
Agriculture & forestry -2.5 -6.8 -2.2 -1.4 -2.9 1.7 -3.1 -4.6
Coalmining 6.8 9.7 10.2 10.0 10.4 10.1 6.1 9.1
Housing and communal services 2.5 3.4 2.3 2.9 2.7 2.5 1.9 2.9
Construction 0.4 -1.1 1.9 0.1 -0.8 -0.7 -1.4 -1.2
Electric industry 2.3 3.0 1.4 2.2 3.0 4.3 2.3 0.9
Gas -16.5 -27.1 -18.4 -20.2 -16.1 -23.1 -22.5
Crude oil extraction -0.4 -1.2 0.2 0.3 -0.7 -1.4 -0.5
Oil refining and processing 2.2 0.4 1.8 3.1 4.5 0.3 -2.5 3.1
Other goods-producing sectors  -10.1 -12.8 -5.2 -8.2 -12.0 -10.7 -13.0 -13.0
Post -0.9 -0.9 -0.6 -0.4 -0.9 -2.1 -1.0 -1.0
Wholesale and retail trade  3.8 5.7 4.9 3.6 4.5 -0.8 4.0 3.9
Textiles and apparel -3.0 -4.5 -2.7 -2.3 -2.7 -2.0 -4.8 -2.5
Source: Authors' calculations.
 
  60Table 18.  Impact of WTO Accession on Exports by Sector and Federal Okrug
change from base year, (%)
Sector
National 
Average Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Railway transportation -3.2 -4.3 -1.0 -2.9 -4.4 -1.4 -6.5 -5.8
Truck transportation 6.7 8.9 8.7 7.0 10.1 0.1 2.4 9.6
Pipelines transportation
Maritime transportation -5.2 -4.2 -2.9 -5.9 -2.3 -5.6 -14.4 -2.5
Air transportation -1.2 -0.7 -1.7 -0.6 4.2 -3.9 -7.1 2.2
Other transportation -7.3 -2.6 -5.1 -6.8 -1.7 -17.8 -13.2 -1.8
Telecommunications 17.0 28.0 17.5 14.5 29.9 -1.0 5.7 29.2
Science & science servicing 30.7 47.0 23.4 23.4 48.9 16.5 19.4 46.3
Financial services  6.1 10.0 6.8 6.3 9.5 0.8 0.9 8.8
Ferrous metallurgy 53.8 53.2 65.3 78.6 52.9 48.4 30.6 50.1
Non-ferrous metallurgy 21.7 10.2 36.9 47.7 33.8 42.1 12.3 11.4
Chemical & oil-chemical industry 43.8 46.2 32.0 36.1 46.6 88.3 42.2 23.5
Mechanical engineering & metal-working 7.1 8.9 7.8 10.3 5.4 5.1 5.5 8.9
Timber & woodworking & pulp & paper industry 4.7 1.2 -3.3 -1.3 7.4 5.2 -4.3 35.2
Construction materials industry 2.9 0.0 3.7 7.2 7.9 2.9 -6.1 5.8
Food industry -6.7 -9.7 -8.6 -3.1 -4.7 -1.8 -10.4 -5.3
Other industries  4.2 4.9 7.1 5.1 -1.8 3.9 -3.3 0.7
Public services, culture and arts -0.7 -1.7 1.5 0.0 -2.4 -1.1 -3.2 -2.4
Agriculture & forestry 3.0 -2.3 3.3 6.0 5.2 6.0 -4.1 2.7
Coalmining 2.7 7.6 6.8 7.6 10.3 1.8 1.1 9.1
Housing and communal services -3.1 -5.9 -2.2 -1.6 -4.1 -0.9 -5.3 -4.0
Construction 1.7 -1.0 6.4 1.5 -1.5 -0.6 -3.4 -1.1
Electric industry 0.8 -1.1 1.1 1.7 1.0 3.6 -1.4 -1.1
Gas -12.8 -57.2 -19.3 -28.4 -11.2 -37.1 -34.9
Crude oil extraction 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.2 0.8 1.3 1.8
Oil refining and processing 4.6 1.3 4.0 6.7 8.3 2.4 -3.2 6.8
Other goods-producing sectors  -11.1 -15.2 -3.2 -7.6 -13.9 -11.4 -16.1 -15.2
Post 0.8 -1.4 2.6 2.4 1.4 -1.5 -2.3 1.1
Wholesale and retail trade  -4.3 -7.1 -4.6 -2.3 -2.9 -4.5 -4.8 -4.1
Textiles and apparel 11.7 7.8 13.0 13.6 12.6 12.6 6.7 12.2
Source: Authors' calculations.
 
  61Table 19.  Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis -- Welfare Impacts as a percent of GDP by Region 
change from base year, (%), utilitarian SWF
Sector National Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Reference Case: 4.5 5.7 4.2 4.5 5.1 3.6 4.1 5.1
Regional investment potential variation
c  4.8 5.6 4.6 4.5 6.2 3.9 3.8 5.0
esubc=1.5 4.8 6.1 4.5 4.8 5.5 3.7 4.4 5.4
esubc=0.5 4.2 5.4 3.9 4.3 4.8 3.6 3.9 4.8
esubs = 2.0 5.9 7.5 5.5 5.8 7.0 4.5 5.3 6.7
esubs = 0.5 3.5 4.5 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.0 3.3 4.1
sigmadm = 4 4.5 5.7 4.2 4.6 5.1 3.6 4.1 5.1
sigmadm = 2 4.5 5.7 4.2 4.5 5.1 3.6 4.1 5.1
etaf = 17.5 5.4 6.7 5.2 5.5 6.1 4.4 5.0 5.8
etaf = 12.5 3.9 5.2 3.7 3.9 4.5 3.1 3.5 4.6
etad = 10 4.7 6.0 4.5 4.5 5.1 3.6 4.2 5.5
etad = 5 4.2 5.3 3.7 4.3 5.1 3.7 4.0 4.5
esub = 4 4.4 5.4 4.1 4.5 5.0 3.7 4.1 4.9
esub = 2 4.3 6.0 4.1 4.3 5.0 3.1 3.6 5.2
esubva=1.3 4.5 5.7 4.2 4.5 5.1 3.6 4.1 5.1
esubva=0.7 4.5 5.7 4.2 4.6 5.1 3.6 4.1 5.2
etadx = 7 4.5 5.7 4.2 4.5 5.1 3.6 4.1 5.1
etadx = 3 4.5 5.7 4.2 4.5 5.1 3.7 4.2 5.2
Source: Authors' calculations.
Notes:
Elasticity of transformation, domestic output 
versus exports (5)
b. Hicksian equivalent variation as a percent of the value of consumption in the benchmark equilibrium.
a. The piecemeal sensitivity analysis employs central values for all parameters (see below) other than the tested parameter and lump sum tax replacement. 
c  We vary etaf by region as follows: North = 10; Central = 12.5; South = 11.5; Volga=18; Urals = 14.3;   Siberia = 10.8; Far East = 10.8. 
Elasticity of Russian service firm supply with 
respect to price of output (7.5)
Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties 
in imperfectly competitive sectors (3)
Elasticity of substitution in sectoral value added 
(1)
Elasticity of substitution in consumer 
demand (1.0)
Elasticity of substitution between value-added 
and business services (1.25)
"Armington" elasticity of substitution between 
imports and domestic goods in CRTS sectors 
(3.0)
Elasticity of multinational service firm supply 
with respect to price of output (15)
 
  62Table 20.   Welfare Impact as % of Income
National Northwest Central South Volga Urals Siberia Far East
Average 4.5 5.6 4.4 4.5 4.9 3.9 3.8 5.1
10 4.1 5.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 4.8
20 4.2 5.4 4.0 4.2 4.3 3.6 3.8 4.0
30 4.2 5.4 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.6 3.6 4.8
40 4.3 5.3 4.2 4.1 4.4 3.6 3.7 4.8
50 4.3 5.6 4.2 4.3 4.5 3.5 3.7 4.7
60 4.4 5.4 4.4 4.3 4.4 3.6 3.6 4.5
70 4.4 5.4 4.5 4.4 4.4 3.6 3.6 4.6
80 4.4 5.5 4.3 4.3 4.7 3.6 3.8 4.9
90 4.4 5.2 4.4 4.4 4.6 3.7 3.7 4.9
100 4.6 6.1 4.4 4.8 5.3 4.1 3.8 5.7
Source: Authors' calculations.
change from base year, %
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Figure 1.   Sales for Constant Returns to Scale Sectors: Determined by 
Constant  Elasticity of Transformation Production Structure
CET
σT = 5 = etadx
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Figure 4.   Structure of Production for Increasing Returns to Scale Russian Firms: 
Representative Good or Service in a  Representative  Regional Market (RM) m
Gross output
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σ = etad = 7.5
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Figure 6.   Structure of Production for Increasing Returns to Scale Multinational Business Service Firms: 
Representative Business Service in a Representative Regional Market (RM) m
Gross output  
CES
σ = 15 = etaf




































































IRTS good i a/
CES
Composite


















































































a/   i = l ,…, g  where g is the number of IRTS goods
b/   j = l ,…, l  where l is the number of CRTS goods
Sales to Own Regional Market
σ = 0

























Figure 6.   Structure of Production for Increasing Returns to Scale Multinational Business Service Firms: 
Representative Business Service in a Representative Regional Market (RM) m
Gross output
CES
σ = 15 = etaf




































































IRTS good i a/
CES
Composite


















































































a/   i = l ,…, g  where g is the number of IRTS goods
b/   j = l ,…, l  where l is the number of CRTS goods
Sales to Own Regional Market
σ = 0
























Russian ImportsMoney-Metric Social Welfare
June 1, 2007
When we work with a general equilibrium model in which there are multiple households,









in which nh is the number of individuals represented by household type h and uh() is the
utility function for household h. In this social welfare function º is a measure of inequality
aversion. When º ! 0, the social welfare function is Rawlsian, and the only changes which
matter are those of the least well o® household. When º ! +1, the social welfare function
is utilitarian, and equivalent money-metric welfare impacts on poor and right households are
valued identically in terms of social welfare.
One challenge involved in working with a social welfare function is de¯ning appropriate
utility indices for individual households. If household utility functions are not identical, the
de¯nition of SWF() is problematic. In order to deal with this logical problem we express
household welfare using money-metric welfare indicies. This is only possible with household
welfare indices are homothetic or quasi-homothetic. For example, if welfare for household h









then utility is a linear function of income. That is, if we solve
maxuh(ch) s.t. p
Tch = Mh











where ¾h = 1=(1 ¡ ½h). Notably, a one percent change in Mh is equivalent to a one percent
change in Vh.
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Hence, when household utility functions are homothetic, it is possible to discuss changes
in social welfare as equivalent variations in aggregate expenditure. In a computational model
this result permits us to describe a given policy shock as EVswf(º), i.e. a proportional change
in aggregate expenditure which depends on the degree of aversion to inequality.
Let illustrate using concrete example. Assume that we have reference per-household










where ¹ Mh = ¹ pT¹ ch is the reference income level of household h.
A policy shock might then lead to household consumption levels ^ ch, and weould could
then compute the equivalent change in social welfare as:






h nh( ^ Mh)1¡1=º
P





^ Mh = ¹ Mh
uh(^ ch)
uh(¹ ch)
2